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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
STATE OF UTAH 
OTIS B. KIRK, I 
I BRIEF OF APPELLANT 
Plaintiff, Appellant, I 
I District Court No. 924901709 
vs. I 
I Court of Appeals No. 940067-CA 
PEGGIE M. KIRK, I 
I Priority Classification: 15 
Defendant, Appellee. I 
BRIEF OF APPELLANT 
PLAINTIFF/APPELLANT (hereinafter "appellant" or "Mr. Kirk") submits the 
following as his brief of Appellant herein: 
JURISDICTIONAL AUTHORITY 
Jurisdiction to hear the above entitled appeal is conferred upon the Utah Court 
of Appeals, pursuant to Utah Code Section 78-2a-3 (1953 as amended). 
NATURE OF THE PROCEEDINGS 
This is domestic relations appeal from a final Findings of Fact, Conclusions of 
Law and Decree of Divorce and denial of the Appellant's Motion for New Trial or in 
the Alternative, to Alter and Amend the Decree of Divorce. 
The Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law and Decree of Divorce were entered 
on October 18, 1993 after a trial held on March 4, 9, and 23, 1993. 
The Appellant filed a Motion for new trial or in the alternative, to alter and 
amend Judgment on October 28,1993 pursuant to Rule 59 of the Utah Rules of Civil 
Procedure. 
The Trial Court denied the Appellant's Motion for new trial in an order dated 
January 7, 1994. 
The notice of appeal was timely filed on January 27, 1994. 
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES 
A. Did the Trial Court abuse its discretion in awarding the Appellee the 
amount of $1000.00 per month as permanent alimony when the marriage was one 
year in duration and both parties were substantially restored to their prior financial 
status. 
B. The facts and circumstances presented to the Trial Court do not support 
the award of $1000.00 per month alimony in that neither the Appellee's financial 
need was established nor any evidence to support the parties' standard of living 
during the marriage and Appellee's financial circumstances do not warrant the 
amount awarded. 
C. The Trial Court erred in the entry of its findings and conclusions in that 
they do not support the material issues which govern the determination of spousal 
support, i. e., financial condition and needs of the receiving spouse, ability of the 
receiving spouse to produce sufficient income for herself and the ability of the 
responding spouse to provide support. 
D. The Trial Court erred in determining that the purported promise of the 
Appellant to induce the reluctant Appellee into the marriage where the Appellant 
would take care of the Appellee and that she would not have to worry financially was 
a factor which warrants an award of alimony. 
E. The Trial Court erred in ruling that the Appellant's promise which 
induced the Appellee to allegedly give up financial security is enforceable and therefor 
warrants a permanent alimony award even though the marriage was of very short 
duration. 
F. The Trial Court abused its discretion in awarding attorney's fees to 
Appellee without a showing of 1) the Appellee's need for assistance in all or part of 
the attorney's fees incurred, 2) sufficient difficulty of the litigation, 3) the necessity 
and reasonableness of time expended by Appellee's attorney and para-legal staff, 4) 
the reasonableness given the usual hourly rate in the community, and, 5) the 
reasonableness of the fee based on the result obtained. 
G. The Trial court erred in assessing Appellee's attorney's fees to the 
Appellant because of the purported unreasonable approach Appellant took to the 
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resolution of the case by not considering that Appellant prevailed on the major issue 
concerning the division of property Appellant asserted in the trial. 
DETERMINATIVE PROVISIONS, CASES, STATUTES AND RULES 
The following statutes may be determinative concerning the issues being addressed 
by this appeal: Utah Code Sections 25-5-4, 30-3-3, and 30-3-5. Copies of the 
aforesaid sections are attached hereto and incorporated herein as Exhibit "A". 
STANDARD OF REVIEW 
The standard of review in this appeal as to the issues presented on appeal is 
whether the Trial Court abused its discretion. Chambers v. Chambers, 840 P.2d 841 
(Utah App. 1992), Baker v. Baker, 226 Utah Adv. Rep. 27, 866 P.2d 540 (Utah App. 
1993), Munns v. Munns, 790 P.2d 116 (Utah App. 1990), Kerr v. Kerr, 610 P.2d 1384 
(Utah 1980). 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Mr. Kirk filed his Complaint for Divorce on April 2, 1992, Case No. 
924901709DA. (R.O.A. 2-4) Ms. Kirk filed her Complaint for Divorce shortly 
thereafter, Case No. 924901796DA. All references to the record contained herein are 
to the Case No. filed by Mr. Kirk unless otherwise noted. 
At a hearing on May 12,1992, Mr. Kirk was granted the exclusive occupancy 
of his pre-marital residence located 3518 South 2000 East, Salt Lake City, Utah and 
Ms. Kirk was ordered to find other living accommodations after June 1, 1992. Ms. 
Kirk was awarded $1,000.00 per month as temporary alimony during the pendency 
of this action. (R.O.A. 7-9, Case No. 924901796DA filed by Ms. Kirk) 
A Motion and Stipulation to consolidate Ms. Kirk's case within Mr. Kirk's case 
dated July 22, 1992 was filed the same date. (R.O.A. 6) An Order granting the 
Motion to consolidate was entered on July 23, 1992. (R.O.A. 7) 
Subsequently, discovery was pursued and obtained by both parties, including 
Request for Production of Documents, Interrogatories, and Depositions. 
Mr. Kirk filed his certificate of Readiness of Trial on October 8,1992. (R.O.A. 
12) 
Ms. Kirk filed an Answer and Counterclaim on March 3,1993. (R.O A. 37-39) 
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Trial proceedings were conducted on March 4, 9, and 23, 1993 before the 
Honorable Timothy R. Hanson, who took the matter under advisement at the 
conclusion thereof. 
Judge Hanson issued his Memorandum Decision on May 4, 1993 which was 
entered on the same date. A copy of said Memorandum is attached hereto and 
incorporated herein as Exhibit "B". 
On October 18, 1993, Mr. Kirk filed a Motion for New Trial or in the 
alternative to Alter or Amend Judgment (R.O.A. 112-113) along with a Memorandum 
in support thereof. (R.O.A. 106-111) 
On November 19, 1993, the time for Ms. Kirk to respond having expired and 
not having filed any response, Mr. Kirk filed a Notice to Submit the aforesaid Motion 
for Decision. (R.O.A. 114-115) 
On November 23, 1993, Ms. Kirk filed a Memorandum in Opposition to Mr. 
Kirk's Motion for New Trial. (R.O.A. 122-127) 
Subsequently, Mr. Kirk filed a Motion to Strike Ms. Kirk's Memorandum as 
being untimely (R.O. A. 128-129) and Ms. Kirk filed a Reply thereto. (R.O.A. ISO-
IS 1). A ruling denying Mr. Kirk's Motion to Strike was entered shortly thereafter 
(R.O.A. 132) and an Order thereon signed and entered on January 7, 1994. (R.O.A. 
161) 
Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law were signed and entered on October 
18, 1993 (R.O.A. 136-155) and a Decree of Divorce was signed and entered on the 
same date. (R.O.A. 156-160) A copy of the Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law 
is attached hereto and incorporated herein as Exhibit "C". A copy of the Decree of 
Divorce is attached hereto and incorporated herein as Exhibit "D". 
Mr. Kirk filed his Notice of Appeal on January 27,1994 (R.O.A. 162-163) and 
Ms. Kirk filed her Notice of Cross Appeal on February 9,1994. (R.O.A. 186-187) 
STATEMENT OF THE FACTS 
Overall Facts of the Case 
Both parties had been married prior to the parties' marriage. Mr. Kirk had 
been previously married in 1948, which marriage lasted for more than forty-two 
years. (Transcript from the trial proceedings held on March 4, 1993 [hereinafter, 
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TV1]:17 L10-11) They had two children as issue of the marriage, both of whom have 
reached the age of majority. Mr. Kirk's wife from the previous marriage, Marjorie 
Kirk, died on September 12, 1990. (TV1:18 L2-20) 
Peggy Kirk, Defendant/Appellee herein, had been previously married on five 
occasions. She has three children, one child as a result of her prior marriage to Wally 
Suberry and two children as the result of a marriage to Garth Campbell. All of her 
children have been emancipated. Her last marriage of eight years, to a Mr. Bob 
Taylor, ended in divorce in 1984. (TV1:16 L20-24) As a result of said divorce Ms. 
Kirk was entitled to Two Hundred Dollars ($200.00) per week permanent alimony 
prior to the marriage of the parties herein, until she should die, remarry, cohabitate, 
or in the event of the death of Mr. Taylor. (Transcript from trial proceedings held 
March 9, 1993 [hereinafter, TV2]:116 L25, 117 Ll-22) (Defendant's Exhibit 28) 
Prior to the parties' marriage, Mr. Kirk had two years of college and was 
employed in the U.S. Navy for several years, and then performed carpentry and 
construction work for several years. (TV1:19 Ll-11) Beginning in 1969, Mr. Kirk 
then commenced working in various positions for the Boise Cascade Company. 
(TV1.19 L13-21) After working twenty (20) years for said company, he retired in 
1989 as the purchasing manager. (TV1:20 L6-18) All of Mr. Kirk's retirement 
benefits were earned prior to the parties' marriage. (TV1:21 L4-19) 
Mr. Kirk's former wife, Marjorie, worked for the telephone company during 
their marriage for twenty-five (25) years and retired therefrom in about 1989. 
(TV1:21 L20-25,22 Ll-3) Mr. Kirk inherited Marjorie's retirement benefits when she 
died on September 12, 1990 (TV1:18 L17-20), prior to the marriage of the parties 
herein. (TV1:22 L4-18) 
Ms. Peggy Kirk, appellee herein, was self-employed in a beauty shop while she 
was raising her children. She then became a director of a health club in Phoenix, 
Arizona. She worked as a real estate agent from 1984 to 1986 and since 1986 to the 
present, has been employed as a licensed security and insurance sales person. 
The parties were married on June 1, 1991. (TV1:16 L18-22) The idea of 
becoming married was pursued mutually by both parties (TV1:26 L16-20,154 L12-19) 
Mr. Kirk was 66 years old at the time of the marriage and 67 years old at the time 
of the divorce. (TV1:16 L14-17) Ms. Kirk was 65 years old at the time of the 
marriage and 66 years old at the time of the divorce. (TV2:116 L6-14) No children 
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were born as issue of the marriage. The parties separated from each other less than 
a year after becoming married. 
Prior to their marriage, the parties discussed their respective financial 
situations with each other. (TV1:26 L21 to 28 L18) Ms. Kirk was fully aware that 
the alimony she was receiving from her former spouse would cease upon the parties' 
marriage. (TV1:28 L19-25, 29 Ll-22) 
Though Mr. Kirk was aware that Ms. Kirk would lose her entitlement to 
alimony from her former spouse upon their marriage, he did not assure her prior to 
the marriage that he would make up the difference after their marriage (TV1:159 L24 
to 160 L3, TV2:3 L24 to 4 L8) nor that he would replace the difference in the event 
of divorce. (TV2:36 L18-20) 
Prior to the marriage, Mr. Kirk assisted Ms. Kirk in qualifying to receive 
$496.00 per month in Social Security. (TV2:42 L5-10, 119 L18-22, 132 L7-11) 
In anticipation of the marriage and seeking to commence the marriage 
relationship on a good foundation, Mr. Kirk paid the following medical bills and 
creditors in Ms. Kirk's behalf at her request, or with the mutual understanding of 
both parties: 
1. January 17, 1991 Liposuction $2,700.00 
2. February 28, 1991 Chase Visa 3,200.00 
3. March 18, 1991 Cottonwood Ctr. 1,065.00 
4. Wedding ring 5,844.00 
Total: $12,890.00 
Approximately two weeks following the parties' marriage, at Ms. Kirk's urging 
they created a trust. (TV1:30 L5-25, 31 Ll-11) (PlaintifFs Exhibit 1) Ms. Kirk 
refused to consult with counsel regarding the creation of the trust available at no 
charge through the credit union at which they both had accounts. Instead, Ms. Kirk 
insisted they go through Lorin Martin, the attorney of her choice. The purpose of the 
trust was to function as an estate planning device in the event of the death of either 
or both of them. (TVl:35Ll-5) The provisions of the trust provided that either party 
could subsequently revoke at any time and remove without the other's consent, any 
asset they respectively placed in the trust. (TV1:35 L18-25) (Article Four on page 
two of the trust - PlaintifFs Exhibit 1) Only three of the parties' financial accounts 
were actually placed in the trust, the first two of which and the last of which, were 
owned respectively by Mr. and Ms. Kirk prior to their marriage: 
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1. Valley Bank & Trust, Account # 02-30-406-6-5 
2. Franklin U. S. Government Security Funds 
3. Interstate Bank, Checking Account #28-15407-7 
Though the aforesaid individual accounts were placed in joint tenancy, they 
were never added to or expended by either party added as a joint tenant. (TV2:40 
L17-23, 168 L18 to 169 L23) 
Mr. Kirk's pre-marital assets including property inherited from his deceased 
wife, decreased in value from the marriage date to the trial date from $384,197.54 to 
$355,173.90 based on the expert testimony of a Certified Public Accountant who had 
previously worked for ten years as an IRS criminal investigator. (TV2:81 L8-14, 96 
L16 to 97 L9) (Plaintiffs Exhibit 9, page 6) 
The parties filed joint federal and state income tax returns for 1991. (TV1:92 
L23 to 93 Ll l ) (Plaintiffs Exhibit 7) As a result of their mutual tax liability, Mr. 
Kirk paid $12,348 to the Internal Revenue Service and $4,178 to the State of Utah. 
The aforesaid payments included the tax liability incurred by Ms. Kirk for $9,600.00 
in alimony received from her previous husband prior to and after the parties' 
marriage (TV1.183 L17 to 184 L5) as well as her liability for other income she 
received. (Plaintiffs Exhibit 7, first page, line 11) (TV1:103 L10-21) Ms. Kirk 
refused to pay any amount towards the tax liability attributable to her (TV2:42 Lll-
21), though she admitted her separate liability was nearly $3,000.00 (TV2:61 L7-25) 
Facts Specifically Related to Issues on Appeal: Alimony, Attorneys Fees and Costs 
When the parties were married, Ms. Kirk had $5,388.37 in her checking 
accounts at First Interstate Bank. (TV2:170 L16-20) (Defendant's Exhibit 32) Those 
accounts increased to nearly $8,000.00 shortly before trial as reflected in the ending 
balances shown as of February 21,1993. (Defendant's Exhibit 31) At the conclusion 
of the trial she owed $6,505.05 for attorneys fees and costs incurred. 
Ms. Kirk claimed to be receiving only $1,602.00 per month in net spendable 
income (Defendant's Exhibit 24) while incurring $2,287.00 in monthly expenses 
(Defendant's Exhibit 25). No documentation supporting her alleged expenses was 
submitted. Though she satisfied such expense during the nine months the case 
proceeded to trial, she alleged that she did not know from where the difference of 
$685.00 per month came. (TV2:164 Ll-6) 
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In addition, she was able to pay her counsel $4,664.92 during the nine month 
proceeding below, an equivalent of $517.21 per month. (Defendant's Exhibit 34) She 
somehow met the $685 and paid the $517.21 averaging more than $1,200 per month 
without disclosing how she did so. She borrowed no funds to pay for either the 
$685.00 shortfall she alleged, nor the average of $517.21 per month for counsel fees. 
None of Ms. Kirk's funds were ever co-mingled with Mr. Kirk's only checking 
account held at Valley Bank nor did Ms. Kirk ever become involved in managing said 
account. (TV1:74 L7-25, 75 Ll-9) Ms. Kirk also continued after the marriage to 
maintain and manage separate from Mr. Kirk, her bank accounts held at First 
Security Bank. (TV1:77 L8 to 79 L17) Ms. Kirk continued after the marriage to 
manage her financial affairs separate from Mr. Kirk. (TV1:81 L18-25, 82 Ll-6) 
During the marriage, each maintained their separate bank accounts, depositing 
and spending their individual income as they did prior to the date of marriage. 
(TV1:82 L21 to 83 L8, 185 L23 to 186 L10, 195 L l l to 196 L3, TV2:11 L6-11, 33 L8 
to 34 L4, 35 Ll-22, 39 L12-25, 40 L24 to 41 L22, 82 L10 to 84 L5, 95 L2 to 96 L14, 
178 L22 to 179 L12, 184 L20 to 185 L16) 
During the first six months that the parties cohabited after marriage, they 
resided in Ms. Kirk's rental apartment while Mr. Kirk's pre-marital home was in the 
process of re-construction. (TV1:82 L7-16,134 L21 to 135 L6,186 L12-21) Following 
completion of the re-construction, they parties resided in Mr. Kirk's pre-marital 
residence during the last six months prior to their separation on May 31, 1992. 
(TV1:82 L17-20) 
Mr. Kirk's income is all derived from pre-marital assets consisting of interest, 
dividends and pension from his retirement funds and his deceased wife' retirement 
funds. Essentially, his annual income is: 
1. Social Security $10,186.00 
2. Dividends 11,307.00 
3. Interest 7,206.00 
4. His retirement and former 14,212.00 




Mr. Kirk's monthly expenses total $2,319.81. (TV1:85 L7 to 90 L18) 
(Plaintiffs Exhibit 3) 
During the course of the underlying proceedings, Mr. Kirk was ordered to pay 
$1,000.00 per month as temporary alimony to Ms. Kirk. (R.O.A. 7-9, Case No. 
924901796DA filed by Ms. Kirk) The payment of said alimony was derived from Mr. 
Kirk's pre-marital funds. (TV1:101 L21 to 103 L21) Mr. Kirk's only checking account 
maintained at Valley Bank decreased from $24,952.00 at the time of the marriage to 
a minus $824.00 due to the payments of temporary alimony to Ms. Kirk and to meet 
their mutual income tax obligations. (TV1:107 L16 to 108 L15, 137 L9-10, L15-25) 
Ms. Kirk's financial income was substantially unaffected by the marriage. 
(TV1:104 L22 to 106 LI) 
Ms. Kirk maintained her employment nearly full time at Financial Services as 
a licensed security and insurance agent throughout the marriage as she had done for 
nearly a decade prior thereto. (TV1:194 L18-25, TV2:117 L23 to 118 L4) 
At the conclusion of the trial Ms. Kirk's counsel made a proffer concerning her 
attorneys fees and costs. The Trial Court accepted the proffer on the condition that 
in doing so it acknowledged that Mr. Kirk disputed Ms. Kirk's need for such fees and 
costs and that he did not admit to the reasonableness of the same. (TV2:208 L4 to 
210 Ll l ) (Defendant's Exhibit 34) 
Other than the mere proffer, no evidence was introduced addressing the 
reasonableness of Ms. Kirk's attorneys fees and costs. Nothing else was submitted 
to support fee reasonableness based on either 1) the difficulty of the litigation, 2) the 
necessity and reasonableness of the number of hours spent on the case, 3) the fee 
customarily charged in the locality for similar services, nor 4) the result obtained. 
The issues decided by the Trial Court concerned the division of property, 
alimony, and attorney' fees. The issue concerning the division of property, consumed 
by far the majority of the pre-trial discovery, trial preparation, and the trial 
proceedings including testimony and exhibits, upon which issue Mr. Kirk prevailed. 
The Trial Court awarded Ms. Kirk $1,000 per month permanent alimony, 
$6,505 in attorney fees, and $592.47 in costs. 
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SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT 
Ms. Kirk is not entitled to alimony based on the rationale stated by the Trial 
Court. 
The Trial Court erred in awarding alimony where the evidence is insufficient 
to show neither Ms. Kirk's need for alimony, her inability to support herself, nor Mr. 
Kirk's ability to pay. The evidence instead shows, that she has no need given her 
financial condition, that she is able to support herself, and Mr. Kirk's disability to 
pay. 
The Trial Court further erred in basing alimony on 1) an invalid replacement 
theory, 2) a disputed oral promise, which basis is contrary to the Statute of Frauds, 
3) standard of living, though the evidence shows the parties never established nor 
experienced a combined standard of living, and 4) inadequate consideration of the 
length of the marriage (one year) in unfairly granting Ms. Kirk the effect of a life-
time annuity of $1,000.00 per month as alimony. 
The alimony award effectively replaced Ms. Kirk's lost alimony. Ms. Kirk is 
not entitled to have Mr. Kirk replace her prior alimony of approximately $800.00 per 
month from a prior eight year marriage. She is not so entitled on two grounds: 
First, because her prior alimony is irrelevant under Utah case law and because 
such replacement operates to improperly impose a penalty upon Mr. Kirk and 
improperly reward Ms. Kirk. Ms. Kirk entered the marriage knowing full well her 
alimony would be terminated and therefore, she should bear the responsibility for her 
loss of alimony. Second, basing the alimony award upon Mr. Kirk's purported and 
disputed oral promise of financially taking care of Ms. Kirk upon their marriage is 
contrary to and unenforceable under the Statute of Frauds. Thus, the Trial Court 
should not have imposed a $1,000.00 per month award of permanent alimony upon 
Mr. Kirk on the grounds that Ms. Kirk lost her prior alimony by virtue of the subject 
marriage. 
The necessary evidence for an alimony award - evidence showing the parties 
experience a combined standard of living, was not established due to the fact that 
each party kept and maintained their separate accounts. 
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Ms. Kirk is not entitled to the $1000 per month permanent alimony award 
when giving the necessary consideration to the brevity of the parties' marriage: less 
than one year. Though the Trial Court acknowledged its brevity, the Court did not 
take into adequate consideration its very short duration. 
Each party should bear his or her own attorney's fees. 
The Trial Court has discretion in awarding attorney's fees to either party. 
Nevertheless, in doing so, the Court should consider, a) the need or ability of either 
party to pay attorney's fees, and b) the reasonableness of the fee based on 1) the 
diflBculty of the litigation, 2) the necessity and reasonableness of the number of hours 
spent on the case, 3) the fee customarily charged in the locality for similar services, 
and particularly, 4) the result obtained - which party prevailed on the majority of the 
issues. 
The findings on attorney fees and costs recite no supporting facts and are 
merely conclusory. The Trial Court made no actual findings of fact on any of the 
foregoing factors. Rather, they merely conclude that the fees are reasonable. The 
findings are thus deficient on their face. The findings concerning reasonableness, 
actually being conclusory only, were based solely on Ms. Kirk's counsel's proffer which 
was insufficient to prove reasonableness. 
Need and ability 
While Mr. Kirk's ability exceeds Ms. Kirk's ability, Ms. Kirk has the ability to 
fully pay her own attorney fees. Ms. Kirk's life style was not altered to any 
significant degree and her ability to pay her attorney's fees was unaffected by the 
marriage and its termination. She retains roughly $60,000.00 equity in an 
$80,000.00 condominium, and was able to meet all her expenses plus pay her counsel 
an average of $517 per month during the nine month proceeding below. Ms. Kirk did 
not show that she had the requisite need for an award of attorney fees. Rather, the 
evidence shows she has the assets and income to pay her own fees. 
Reasonableness based on the four above factors 
The evidence does not support that the attorneys fees she incurred were 
reasonable, given the absence of difficulty in the litigation, the lack of necessity and 
unreasonableness of the number of hours spent on the case, the fee customarily 
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charged for similar services, and especially given the result she obtained for having 
incurred her fees, 
ARGUMENT 
I. THE TRIAL COURT ABUSED ITS DISCRETION IN MAKING ITS ALIMONY 
AWARD AND ERRED AS A MATTER OF LAW IN DETERMINING THE 
BASIS THEREOF, 
A. THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN ASSESSING MS. KIRKS 
NEED. HER ABILITY TO PRODUCE SUFFICIENT INCOME 
FOR HERSELF. AND MR. KIRK'S ABILITY TO PAY, 
There are three factors, among others which may be applicable such as those 
argued above, which must be considered by the trial court in assessing the propriety 
of an alimony award. Those three factors, which have been set forth in a number of 
Utah decisions, are as follows: 
[1] the financial conditions and needs of the spouse requesting alimony; 
[2] the ability of the requesting spouse to produce sufficient income for that 
spouse's needs; and 
[3] the ability of the responding spouse to provide support. 
(See Schindler v. Schindler, 776 R2d 84 (Ut. App, 1989), Boyle v. Boyle, 735 P.2d 
669,671 (Ut. App. 1987) Paffel v. Paffel, 732 P.2d 96 (Utah 1986), Jones v. Jones, 700 
P.2d 1072, 1075 (Utah 1985), and English v. English, 565 P.2d 409, 411-12 (Utah 
1977)) 
In Rudman v. Rudman, 812 P.2d 73, 76 (Ut. App. 1991), this Court stated, 
We emphasize one again that, in considering these factors, the 
trial court must make adequate factual findings on all material issues 
unless the facts in the record are "clear, ^incontroverted, and capable of 
supporting only a finding in favor of the judgment." (citing Houmont, 
793 R2d at 424.) 
(See also Throckmorton v. Throckmorton, 767 P.2d 121, 124 (Ut. App. 1988) 
Also, in Boyle v. Boyle, 735 P.2d 669, 671 (Ut. App. 1987): 
This court concurs in the supreme Court's reflection that more 
detailed findings on each required factor would assist in the appellate 
process. 
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In Bell v. Bell9 810 P.2d 489, 492 (Ut. App. 1991) this Court noted: 
[T]he trial court must make sufficiently detailed findings of fact 
on each factor to enable a reviewing court to ensure that the trial court's 
discretionary determination was rationally based upon these three 
factors, (citations omitted) If sufficient findings are not made, we must 
reverse.... 
This Court has further noted in Rasband v. Rasband, 752 R2d 1331,1334 (Ut. 
App. 1988): 
The findings "should be sufficiently detailed and include enough 
subsidiary facts to disclose the steps by which the ultimate conclusion 
on each factual issue was reached." Acton v. Deliran, 737 P.2d 996, 999 
(Utah 1987) (quoting Rucker v. Dalton, 598 P.2d 1336,1338 (Utah 1979). 
Recently, in Baker v. Baker, 866 P.2d 540, 546-7 (Ut. App. 1993), this Court 
went further and noted that the Trial Court must do more that simply restate the 
requesting spouse's testimony concerning monthly expenses: "This finding is plainly 
insufficient because it fails to adequately address [the requesting spouse's] financial 
condition and needs." This Court explained that simply restating the requesting 
spouse's testimony regarding expenses does not justify their reasonableness nor 
explain how the court arrived at a certain sum as an appropriate amount of alimony. 
Both in Chambers v. Chambers, 840 P.2d 841843 (Ut. App. 1992) and Canning 
v. Canning, 744 R2d 325, 326 (Ut. App. 1987) this Court stated that findings 
concerning the requesting spouse must include that spouse's level of education, 
health, and other matters concerning the spouse's immediate or eventual 
employability. 
This court has also noted in Burt v. Burt, 799 P.2d 1166,1170 (Ut. App. 1990) 
that "alimony may not be automatically awarded whenever there is disparity between 
the parties' incomes." 
The Trial Court's findings do not pass the muster of the above stated 
requirements and that the facts are sufficiently controverted to question the findings. 
Ms. Kirk's financial condition and needs. 
Other than a few personal property items which she disposed of upon the 
parties' marriage, all of Ms. Kirk's premarital assets were restored to her by award 
of the Trial Court. She still owns and controls her condominium in Arizona in which 
she has nearly $60,000 in equity. She was awarded all her premarital household 
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furniture and fixtures which had not be disposed of upon the parties' marriage. She 
retains her 1983 Lincoln Continental Mark VI automobile and both her checking 
accounts held at First Interstate Bank. 
At the time the parties married, the beginning balance of Ms. Kirk's checking 
accounts at First Interstate Bank was $5,388.37. (TV2:170 L16-20) (Defendant's 
Exhibit 32) A copy of Defendant's Exhibit 32 is attached hereto and incorporated as 
Exhibit "E". Ms. Kirk testified that those accounts increased to $7,976.88 at the time 
of trial. (See ending balances shown as of February 21, 1993 in Defendant's Exhibit 
31) A copy of Defendant's Exhibit 31 is attached hereto and incorporated as Exhibit 
"F". Thus, her bank balance increased by $2,588.51. 
Ms. Kirk further testified that her medical insurance coverage will increase 
from what it had been in the past. (TV2.197 L14 to 198 L9) When asked on cross 
examination, "So is it more extended coverage, or less in coverage than you had 
before you got married?", she replied, "It would be more...It's FHP is what it is." 
When asked if "It's a more extended coverage now than you had before the 
marriage?", she replied, "I have major medical." (TV2:198 L2-9) 
Ms. Kirk's restoration to her premarital financial condition including her 
condominium equity and the evidence showing a substantial increase in her bank 
account, does not demonstrate that she has a need for a $1,000 per month permanent 
alimony award. 
Ms. Kirk's ability to produce sufficient income for herself. 
The findings do not address Ms. Kirk's level of education and her health 
condition, factors required under Chambers concerning Ms. Kirk's employability. 
Ms. Kirk has been licensed in securities and insurance and worked in that field 
for nearly a decade. (TV2:117 L23 to 118 L4) (TV2:187 L7-15) She testified that she 
worked nearly full time during the marriage, has flexible hours, and can work as 
many hours as she wants. (TV2.190 L7 to 192 L4) On cross examination she was 
asked, "Before the marriage you were working eight hours a day?", to which she 
answered, "Roughly." (TV2:192 L17-19) 
Ms. Kirk is also receiving $496.00 per month in Social Security benefits which 
she was not receiving at the time of her prior divorce. (TV2:119 L18-22) It was Mr. 
Kirk who assisted Ms. Kirk in obtaining the aforesaid Social Security benefit. (TV2: 
L7-11) Even considering the $860.00 per month in prior alimony, lost by the 
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marriage, Ms. Kirk's $496.00 Social Security results in a difference of only $364.00 
per month. 
Ms. Kirk listed her purported expenses on Defendant's Exhibit 25. Said 
Exhibit was admitted as illustrative only of her testimony. (TV2:125 Ll-5) A copy 
of Defendant's Exhibit 25 is attached hereto and incorporated as Exhibit "G". An 
inspection of Exhibit 25 alleging her expenses reveals figures which are at best rough 
estimates which have been rounded off to suit its purpose of supporting a high total. 
When asked regarding the preciseness of her Exhibit 25 figures she responded that 
her expenses vary, "but it's roughly that, but I can't tell you the dates that I buy 
things." (TV2:193 L3-7) None of the figures listed on her Statement of Monthly 
Expenses were supported by any documentation whatsoever. 
Ms. Kirk claimed to have only $1,602 "net expendable monthly income with 
alimony at $1,000 per month" (TV2:119 L13 to 123 L7) (Defendant's Exhibit 24) and 
have $2,287 in "total monthly expenses". (TV2:123 L8 to 125 L5) (Defendant's 
Exhibit 25) A copy of Defendant's Exhibit 24, admitted soley as illustrative of her 
testimony (TV2:211 L20-25), is attached hereto and incorporated as Exhibit "H". Yet 
while meeting the $685 difference between her net income and expenses during the 
course of the proceedings, she also paid her counsel $4,664.92, an average of $517.21 
per month. (Total of retainer and payments listed on Defendant's Exhibit 34: 
$1,000.00 + $262.65 + $233.77 + $1,190.05 + $56.25 + $412.65 + $396.70 + $987.85 
+ $125.00) A copy of Defendant's Exhibit 34 is attached hereto and incorporated as 
Exhibit "I". She also increased her checking account balance $2,588.51 as shown in 
the above section addressing her need. 
When asked how she could possibly be meeting the $685 difference between the 
$2,287 in expenses she claimed and her $1,602 in expendable income (TV2:162 L l l 
to 167 L6) she attempted to claim having to make withdrawals from her checking 
account balance. (TV2:166 L3 to 167 L6) Nevertheless, when asked directly, ffWhere 
does the extra $600.00 come from?", her response was equally direct: "These are the 
figures. I don't know." (TV2:164 L5-6) Though being licensed and actively employed 
for nearly a decade in selling securities and insurance, she claimed she didn't know 
how she was meeting the $685 per month shortfall in expenses she alleged. As noted 
above, her bank balances increased nearly $3,000.00 while she met all her alleged 
expenses. She was obviously not drawing on her bank balance to meet her expenses. 
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Ms. Kirk never claimed to have borrowed funds to meet the purported $685 
difference nor to have borrowed funds to pay her counsel. It would have been 
impossible for her to have paid her counsel $517.21 per month and meet the $685.00 
per month shortfall while only having the income she claimed, unless she seriously 
inflated her actual expenses and/or under reported her income. The $685.00 in 
expenses she met and the $517.21 paid to her counsel, equals $1,202.21 in monthly 
payments she made from income that is unaccounted for from her income as claimed. 
Based thereon, Ms. Kirk must actually be receiving over $1,200.00 per month from 
sources which were not disclosed to Mr. Kirk or the Court. For her income to be 
otherwise, her actual monthly expenses must be approximately $1,200 less than she 
claimed. She cannot have it both ways. 
The $1,000.00 per month alimony award is obviously a windfall for Ms. Kirk. 
The $2,600.00 bank account increase plus the $4,600.00 paid in fees equals $7,200.00, 
an average of $800.00 per month income during the nine month proceeding in excess 
of her claimed expenses. At most, a $200.00 per month award would meet her 
alleged, though unsubstantiated need. 
The trial court failed to consider the fact that Ms. Kirk not only met all her 
expenses during the course of the nine month proceeding below, but had the ability 
to pay her counsel $517.21 per month during the same period. The Trial Court failed 
to realize that Ms. Kirk must have had either a) at least an additional $1,200 per 
month in undisclosed income to enable her to meet her expenses and pay such 
counsel fees, or b) that her unsubstantiated claim of expenses is inflated 
approximately $1,200 above actuality, or c) a combination of the foregoing two 
aspects. The aforesaid $1,200 per month discrepancy shows that Ms. Kirk is 
financially able to provide for herself without any assistance from Mr. Kirk, let alone 
a permanent $1,000 per month award. Had the Trial Court considered the above 
facts, it would not have awarded Ms. Kirk any alimony. 
Mr. Kirk's ability to pay. 
Mr. Kirk received no earned income while the parties courted each other nor 
during the marriage. His sole source of income is derived from Social Security along 
with investment and retirement income earned by him and his deceased wife prior 
to the marriage. Approximately one-third of his income is derived from sources 
inherited from his deceased wife. These sources include stock or other accounts held 
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with AT&T, Ameritech, Bell Atlantic, Bell South NYNEX, Pactel Southwest Bell and 
US West as shown on Plaintiffs Exhibit 9 noted by "I PM" representing Inherited 
Pre-Marital property. 
The alimony award is thus tantamount to an ongoing distribution of Mr. Kirk's 
premarital estate. The award is equivalent in value to taking the benefits 
accumulated over a lifetime by Mr. Kirk's deceased wife and giving the interest and 
dividends being paid on those benefits to Ms. Kirk for the remainder of her life. 
Whereas Mr. Kirk and his deceased wife planned that Mr. Kirk would be the 
recipient of his deceased wife's benefits, the ongoing payout thereon has now been 
effectively transferred to Ms. Kirk by her replacing Mr. Kirk's deceased wife during 
a short one year relationship. 
Summary on Ms. Kirk's need, her ability to support herself, and 
Mr. Kirk's ability to pay. 
The facts show that Ms. Kirk has no need of alimony. She has the ability to 
support herself from the $1,200 per month along with her $256 in earned income and 
the $496 in Social Security per month. Those figures total $1,952 per month. Her 
$2,287 in claimed, though unsubstantiated expenses, less $1,952 leaves $335. 
Certainly the $335 gap is also met considering the $2,588.51 increase in her bank 
balance. 
Alimony cannot be awarded in excess of Ms. Kirk's need, regardless of Mr. 
Kirk's ability to pay. Recently in Bingham v. Bingham, 236 Utah Adv. Rep 29,31 (Ut. 
App. 1994), this Court stated, 
[T]he trial court apparently awarded plaintiff $701.76 per month 
more than her projected financial requirements. * * * [W]e agree with 
defendant that the court should not have awarded plaintiff more than 
her established needs required, regardless of defendant's ability to pay 
this excess amount. * * * [T]he spouse's demonstrated need must, under 
Jones, constitute the maximum permissible alimony award. 
Since the facts in this case demonstrate that Ms. Kirk has no need, no alimony 
is permissible. Yet the Trial court found, "defendant is in need of alimony." 
(Paragraph 37) The Court's findings that Ms. Kirk receives only $690 income per 
month (Paragraph 38) and that she has $2,287 per month in reasonable expenses 
(Paragraph 39), are clearly erroneous. 
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Since the findings are clearly erroneous where the facts show Ms. Kirk's own 
ability to meet all her claimed need, the alimony award should be reversed and 
vacated in its entirety. In the alternative, the alimony award should be reversed and 
remanded for the following reasons: 
The evidence on the three factors of 1) Ms. Kirk's financial condition and need, 
2) her ability to support herself, and 3) Mr. Kirk's ability to pay, do not support the 
alimony award. 
The findings on the three factors enunciated in Schindler, Boyle, Paffel, Jones, 
and English, are not adequate on all the material issues as required by Rudman and 
Bell. Also, the findings are not detailed enough as required in Boyle. The findings 
do not disclose the steps by which the ultimate conclusion on each factual issue was 
reached as required inRasband. The findings concerning Ms. Kirk's needs obviously 
fail to meet the sufficiency of Baker in that the findings simply restate her testimony 
concerning her monthly expenses. As noted in Baker a simple restatement of Ms. 
Kirk's testimony regarding her expenses does not justify their reasonableness. 
The findings provide that Ms. Kirk's need to which she testified, is based both 
on the standard of living during the marriage and Ms. Kirk's standard of living prior 
to the marriage. (Paragraph 39) Yet, the Trial Court made no findings based on any 
certain dollar figures whatsoever, on either the purported standard of living during 
the marriage nor Ms. Kirk's premarital standard of living. This is not surprising 
since the parties experienced no combined standard of living during the marriage, 
keeping all their expenses strictly separate during their relationship. Further, there 
is insufficient evidence to support what Ms. Kirk's premarital standard of living may 
have been. The Trial Court's finding of Ms. Kirk's need based solely on her 
unsupported testimony of her expenses is inadequate and does not justify their 
reasonableness. 
The trial court did not explain how it arrived at the certain sum of $1,000 per 
month as an appropriate alimony award as required by Baker. 
The findings do not address Ms. Kirk's level of education, though she is 
obviously well educated having a license in securities and insurance for nearly a 
decade. The findings do not address Ms. Kirk's health situation, though she appears 
to be in good health and there was no testimony supporting that she was ailing in 
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any way mentally or physically. The lack of findings on these two issues are contrary 
to both Chambers and Canning. 
The trial court based its finding of reasonableness concerning her need and 
ability to support herself on her unsubstantiated and questionable testimony of both 
her claimed expenses and income. The evidence seriously contradicts the findings 
concerning Ms. Kirk's employability. The testimony supports that she is actively 
employed, working nearly full time, capable of full time employment and that 
nothing, including her age and health, prevents her from being actively employed on 
a full time basis. The Trial Court's findings to the contrary are obviously 
controverted and incapable of supporting only a finding in favor of the judgment as 
required by Throckmorton. 
It seems the Trial court made the alimony award automatically based an what 
appeared to be a disparity in the parties' income. Such a basis is contrary to Burt. 
Ms. Kirk's financial condition shows that she was substantially restored to her 
premarital status. The increase in her bank balance of $2,600 to nearly $8,000 at the 
time of trial belie her need. She was able to meet both, a) the $685 per month 
difference between her stated income and expenses, and b) pay an average of $517.21 
per month toward her attorney fees during the nine month trial proceeding. The 
aforesaid bank balance increase, along with the discrepancy of more that $1,200 per 
month during the nine month proceeding, provides sufficient evidence of her ability 
to support herself. 
Mr. Kirk's only ability to provide support is based on a distribution of earnings 
from premarital assets, including those assets inherited from his deceased wife. The 
alimony award is thus tantamount to an ongoing inappropriate distribution of his 
premarital assets. It is unjustly equivalent to awarding Ms. Kirk the income derived 
from Mr. Kirk's deceased wife's accumulation of benefits acquired by forty years work. 
Given the insufficiency of the findings, the $1,200 discrepancy, and her bank 
balance increase, this court should reverse the alimony award and remand with 
directions to enter findings as required on the factors in which the findings are silent. 
If remanded, the Trial Court should also be directed to address the $1,200 discrepancy 
during the nine month trial proceeding, and the $2,588.51 increase in her bank 
balance. 
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B. THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN BASING ITS ALIMONY 
AWARD TO MS. KIRK ON THE FOLLOWING: 
1. THE INVALID THEORY THAT SHE WAS ENTITLED TO 
HAVE HER PRIOR ALIMONY OF $860.00 PER MONTH 
FROM A PRIOR EIGHT YEAR MARRIAGE REPLACED 
BY MR. KIRK 
In its Findings of Fact, the Trial Court stated, "At the time of the instant 
marriage the defendant was divorced from her prior husband and was receiving 
permanent alimony in the sum of $200 per week, or $860 per month." (Findings of 
Fact, Para. 5, at bottom of p. 2) The Trial Court further found that Ms. Kirk asserted 
"that she is entitled to substantial alimony...in view of what she gave up in the form 
of permanent alimony by agreeing to marry the plaintiff.... (Findings of Fact, Para. 
9) Last, "The Court is satisfied that she would not have entered into the marital 
relationship except for the promises of the plaintiff that she would be reasonably 
financially secure should she agree to give up her sources of income in the form of 
permanent alimony from a prior spouse and enter into the marital relationship with 
the plaintiff. (Findings of Fact, Paragraph 37) 
Nevertheless, Houmont v. Houmont, 793 P.2d 421 (Ut. App. 1990) supports the 
proposition that the Trial court cannot impose an alimony award to the spouse simply 
on the grounds that the spouse lost alimony by virtue of the subject marriage. In 
Houmont, this Court reversed the Trial Court's award of alimony where the main 
justification for awarding alimony was the fact that the spouse lost alimony by 
remarriage. Houmont concerned a three and one-half year marriage with no children 
issuing therefrom. 
In the Houmont case, Ms. Houmont had been receiving permanent alimony of 
$510 per month from a previous husband prior to marrying Mr. Houmont. As in the 
instant case, Mr. Houmont was ordered to pay $1000 per month in temporary 
alimony commencing shortly after the parties' separation and at the conclusion of 
trial the Trial Court "found that each party had premarital property and awarded 
each party his or her own property." Houmont, at 423. Mr. Houmont was also 
ordered to pay $510 per month in permanent alimony. (Id.) 
On appeal, Mr. Houmont argued that "the trial judge awarded alimony to her 
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[Ms. Houmont] on the impermissible grounds that appellee had lost $510 per month 
permanent alimony when she married appellant and, thus, improperly shifted 
appellee's former husband's obligation to appellant." (Id.) 
The Houmont Trial Court found that "as a result of said marriage, the 
Defendant lost alimony in the sum of $510 per month," and that "alimony should be 
granted in favor of Defendant and against the Plaintiff in the sum of $510 per month. 
(Houmont, at 424) 
Absent the requisite findings upon which this court reiterated in Houmont that 
alimony should be based, it reversed the alimony award based on a replacement 
theory and remanded for entry of such findings. 
More recently in Rudman v. Rudman, 812 P.2d 73, 75-77 (Ut. App. 1991) this 
Court ruled that fact of wife losing $1100 per month in alimony by virtue of her 
marriage was an insufficient basis for award of alimony, her lost alimony being 
irrelevant, and reversed the alimony award as a matter of law: 
Both parties had previously been married and divorced. At the 
time of the marriage, Mrs. Rudman had been receiving $1,100 per 
month in permanent alimony from her former husband. 
Mrs. Rudman's alimony from her former marriage terminated 
upon her marriage to Mr. Rudman. 
The findings regarding alimony state that Mrs. Rudman lost 
$1,100 per month in alimony by virtue of her marriage to Mr. rudman 
and that it was therefore, "reasonable and just" that temporary alimony 
of $1,100 per month be paid to her until she reaches age sixty-five, at 
which age she would begin to receive social security benefits. 
This is error in that the amount of alimony lost upon remarriage 
is irrelevant.... 
Because the court erred as a matter of law, we reverse the 
alimony award and remand for adequate findings on the requisite 
factors. 
As was correctly stated by the Utah Supreme Court in Gramme v. Gramme, 
587 R2d 144, 147 (Utah 1979): 
The purpose of alimony is to provide post-marital support; it is 
intended neither as a penalty to be imposed on the husband nor as a 
reward granted to the wife. 
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(See also, Canning v. Canning, 744 P.2d 325, 326 (Ut. App. 1987), Turner v. 
Turner, 649 P.2d 6,8-9 (Utah 1982), and English v. English, 565 P.2d 409,411 (Utah, 
1977) regarding the impropriety of imposing alimony as a penalty or reward.) 
Ms. Kirk's loss of prior alimony by her marriage to Mr. Kirk is no different 
than the loss experienced by young people who marry, move from their parent's 
home, and give up their parent's financial support. Mr. Kirk should not have the 
obligation of replacing the lost alimony any more than the financial support 
previously received from parents should be replaced. 
The only fair and reasonable conclusion that can be reached after a review of 
the Trial Court's actions in connection with its award of alimony vis-a-vis the 
evidence which was presented to it, was that the Trial Court thought that some sort 
of penalty was appropriate because Mr. Kirk had filed for divorce. 
In essence, what the Trial Court did was penalize Mr. Kirk and reward Ms. 
Kirk by unfairly replacing the alimony obligation of Ms. Kirk's former husband 
created by virtue of an eight year marriage. Such a result is patently unfair and not 
in accord with the cases cited above on the issue of alimony. Aflfirming the Trial 
Court's replacement theory would be contrary to established precedent. 
Ms. Kirk's lost alimony is not a basis upon which alimony may be imposed. 
This Court should vacate the alimony award insofar as it was entered on the basis 
that Ms. Kirk was entitled to have her lost alimony replaced by Mr. Kirk. 
2. THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN AWARDING ALIMONY TO MS. KIRK 
BASED ON MR. KIRK'S PURPORTED PRE-MARITAL PROMISE 
THAT HE WOULD FINANCIALLY TAKE CARE OF MS. KIRK FOR 
THE LOSS OF HER ALIMONY FROM A PRIOR EIGHT YEAR 
MARRIAGE. SPECIFICALLY, THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN THAT 
SUCH A BASIS FOR THE ALIMONY AWARD IS CONTRARY TO THE 
STATUTE OF FRAUDS, WHERE THE PARTIES NEVER REDUCED 
TO WRITING NOR SIGNED ANY INSTRUMENT BASED ON SUCH 
PURPORTED PROMISE. 
The Trial Court's findings state: "At the time of the instant marriage the 
defendant was divorced from her prior husband and was receiving permanent 
alimony in the sum of $200 a week, or $860 per month." (Findings of Fact, Para. 2 
at the bottom of page 2) 
22 
The findings further state: "The evidence is clear and the Court finds that 
when confronted with the defendant's reluctance to remarry for the reasons stated 
above [concerning her financial status; i.e., loss of prior awarded alimony] that 
plaintiff promised the defendant that she would not need to worry financially, that 
he would take care of her in a financial setting." (Id., middle of page 3) The findings 
also state: "[T]he defendant ultimately was satisfied based upon the plaintiffs [oral] 
representations that marriage at her stage in life under the circumstances then 
existing would not effect her financial stability even though she would lose her 
permanent alimony. Based on the foregoing, she agreed to marry the plaintiff." (Id., 
top of page 4) 
Later, the findings note in Para. 9 that Ms. Kirk asserts, "that she is entitled 
to substantial alimony based upon the promises and representations of the plaintiff 
in view of what she gave up in the form of permanent alimony by agreeing to marry 
the plaintiff,...." 
Ms. Kirk argued that the "Kirk Family Trust" (Plaintiffs Ex. "1"), executed by 
the parties a couple weeks subsequent to their marriage, should be viewed as a 
pre-nuptial agreement. The Trial Court rejected her view, stating in Paragraphs 20 
and 21 of the findings: 
20. The establishment of the Kirk Family Trust is not and cannot be 
construed as a pre-nuptial agreement which would purportedly govern 
the rights of the parties should a divorce occur. 
21. The Kirk Family Trust was an estate planning device and was so 
contemplated by the parties. 
Paragraph 37 of the findings, further provide the following: 
While the Court has determined that the plaintiffs promises to 
the defendant are not sufficient to allow her to assert a legal claim 
against the plaintiffs premarital properties, the Court is satisfied that 
the plaintiffs promises which induced the defendant to give up financial 
security are enforceable. The plaintiff made promises of financial 
security to the defendant to induce her to enter into the marriage 
relationship. The Court is satisfied that she would not have entered 
into the marital relationship except for the promises of the plaintiff that 
she would be reasonable financially secure should she agree to give up 
her sources of income in the form of permanent alimony from a prior 
spouse and enter into the marital relationship with the plaintiff. The 
plaintiff made a promise which he acknowledges. The promise is 
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significant as far as the defendant was concerned, and the plaintiff 
ought to be held to his promise in all good conscience and in equity. * * 
* This Court, therefore, determines that defendant is entitled to 
permanent alimony from plaintiff.... 
Finally, Paragraph 41 of the findings provides: 
ff[C]onsidering the promises made to the defendant by the plaintiff 
and reasonable needs of the defendant, the Court is satisfied that an 
ongoing alimony requirement in the sum of $1,000 per month is 
necessary and reasonable, which alimony should continue until such 
time as defendant should remarry, cohabit or the death of either party. 
The aforesaid findings imply the evidence supports that both parties 
acknowledged Mr. Kirk's purported promise to financially take care of Ms. Kirk and 
that both parties' testimony is ^incontradictory with respect thereto. Nevertheless, 
Mr. Kirk's responses on cross examination from opposing counsel belie this view: 
Q. Did you tell her that you were making about $4,000 a 
month off of your various investments, and pension plan, social security, 
and you should be able to make it without the alimony? 
A. No. 
(TV1:159 L24 to 160 L3) 
Q. Mr. Kirk, when you testified on direct examination 
yesterday, you testified that you showed your accountings of assets and 
income to Peggie; that she had shown you tax returns, and when she 
brought up the question of alimony you told her that you could make it 
and get by even though the alimony would be lost; is that correct? 
A. No. 
Q. That is not correct? 
A. That's right. 
(TV2:3 L24 to 4 L8) 
Q. Any discussions about alimony, or payment to her if the 
divorce was obtained? 
A. No. 
(TV2:36 L18-20) 
In Ms. Kirk's Trial Memorandum (R.O.A. 114-124, Case No. 924901796) on 
page 3, she relied on Baldwin v. Vantage Corp., 676 P.2d 413 (Utah 1984) for the 
theory that "oral contracts are enforceable...on the basis that the parties admitted to 
such agreement". As shown by Mr. Kirk's testimony above, he disputes rather than 
admits, Ms. Kirk's claim that he would take care of her financially upon their 
marriage or in the event of divorce. Further, Baldwin was not a marital case, rather, 
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it dealt with a dispute over real property. Also, Baldwin noted that, "part 
performance was sufficient to remove the contract from the statute of frauds under 
these circumstances where the existence of the contract was admitted." Id, at 417. 
No conduct of the parties herein shows any performance of the alleged oral 
promise other than the marriage itself. Marriage alone, is not recognized as 
performance as is discussed below. There is no evidence that upon the marriage, Mr. 
Kirk made up for Ms. Kirk's lost alimony. After the marriage, they each continued 
to separately control their assets, income, and separately pay their individual 
expenses. Thus, the facts in Baldwin are clearly distinguishable from the facts in 
this matter. 
Even if Mr. Kirk's had purportedly made the oral promise to Ms. Kirk stated 
in the findings referred to above, such an agreement would be barred as 
unenforceable by the Statute of Frauds. One of the oldest statutory provisions 
regulating marital contracts is the Statute of Frauds. The original Statute of Frauds 
was enacted by the Parliament of England in 1677 to prevent "fraudulent 
practices...upheld by perjury" and other similar abuses that occurred when informal 
contracts, especially oral contracts, were sought to be enforced. (See generally, 
Farnsworth, Contracts 369-73 (1982); 3 Vernier, American Family Laws 51-64 (1935 
Ed reprinted 1971)) 
Section Four of the Statue of Frauds listed five categories of contracts which 
could not be enforced unless they were "in writing, and signed by the party to be 
charged therewith" or by the party's authorized agent. Included was "any agreement 
made upon consideration of marriage." While the Statute of Frauds did not become 
a part of the common law that was adopted in the United States, virtually all states 
have enacted their own versions of the Statute requiring agreements made upon 
consideration of marriage to be in writing. (See Farnsworth, supra at 371) 
Similarly, the Restatement of the Law, Second, Contracts, §124 (1981) 
provides: "A promise for which all or part of the consideration is either marriage or 
a promise to marry is within the Statute of Frauds, except in the case of an 
agreement which consists only of mutual promises of two persons to marry each 
other." Another section reiterates that "a contract made upon consideration of 
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marriage" is unenforceable unless it is in writing or within one of the exceptions to 
the Statute of Frauds. (Id. at §110(l)(c)) 
In Utah, the requirements of the Statute of Frauds is reflected in Utah Code 
Section 25-5-4(3) titled, Certain agreements void unless written and subscribed, which 
provides as follows: 
In the following cases every agreement shall be void unless such 
agreement, or some note or memorandum thereof, is in writing 
subscribed by the party to be charged therewith: 
(3) every agreement, promise, or undertaking made 
upon consideration of marriage, except mutual promises to marry; 
A copy of the aforesaid Section is included herein under Exhibit "A". 
To counsel's knowledge the only marital case in Utah applying its Statute of 
Frauds (§25-5-4(3)), is Brown v. Brown, 744 P.2d 333 (Ut. App. 1987) In Brown, a 
stipulation to a divorce decree, reached between one of the parties anc ^oth counsel, 
while the other party remained silent while it was discussed and read into the 
deposition record, was not binding. The court ruled that for such an agreement to be 
binding, it "must be evidenced by a signed writing which would satisfy the Statute 
of Frauds, or the agreement must be stated in court on the record before a judge. 
The facts in this case do not show such evidence. Therefore, there was no stipulation 
reached between the parties and there is nothing for the court to enforce." Id. at 335. 
Occasionally, issues have arisen in States other than Utah concerning the 
validity of unwritten antenuptial contracts. These issues usually arise when there 
has been alleged performance or part performance of the premarital agreement. 
Nevertheless, Professor Corbin, in his Treatise, Corbin on Contracts, (1963) in Vol. 
2 at §463 notes the following: "The fact that the marriage ceremony has actually 
taken place, so that the consideration for the promise of a settlement is executed, is 
generally held not to take the promise out of the statute or make the promise 
enforceable." In the same section, Corbin notes that such is the prevailing rule 
followed by the courts in America today. 
26 
In most recent cases where one party has attempted to enforce an oral 
antenuptial contract, the courts have been very strict and generally unreceptive to 
the claims. The Hawaii Intermediate Court of Appeals explained the reason for this 
strict judicial scrutiny in Rossiter v. Rossiter, 666 P.2d 617, 621 (1983) where the 
husband appealed from a trial court Supplemental Decree of Divorce ordering that 
the parties' residence was to be sold. The husband alleged that the parties had 
entered into an oral antenuptial agreement to the effect that the wife would never 
force the sale of the marital residence. The Hawaii Statute of Frauds, however, 
requires such antenuptial agreements to be in writing, as does Utah. Nevertheless, 
the husband argued that the oral agreement should be enforced because of part 
performance contending that the parties' marriage, their move to Hawaii, purchase 
of the property and his efforts constructing the house constituted sufficient part 
performance to take the agreement out of the Statute of Frauds. The court rejected 
that argument noting: 
The doctrine of part performance 'takes the case out of the statute 
not because it furnishes proof of the contract, or because it makes the 
contract any stronger, but because it would be intolerable in equity for 
the owner of a tract of land knowingly to suffer another to invest time, 
labor, and money in that land, upon the faith of a contract which did not 
exist/ 73 Am Jur 2d, Statute of Frauds §400 (1974) Consequently, 
courts require the part performance to be of a character which is 
unequivocally referable to the alleged parol agreement and cannot admit 
of explanation without reference to such agreement. 73 Am Jur 2d. 
Statute of Frauds §§405-406 (1974). The acts constituting part 
performance 'must clearly appear to have been done in pursuance of the 
contract, and to result from the contract and not from some other 
relation/ 30 ALR2d at 1421-1422. 
The mere act of marriage is almost universally held to be 
insufficient part performance and additional acts are not necessarily 
sufficient either. 30 ALR2d at 1420; 73 Am Jr 2d at 136. 
The evidence in the instant matter indicates not even partial performance of 
Mr. Kirk's alleged promise. Throughout their brief one year marriage, both parties 
kept their financial dealings separate. Mr. Kirk did not replace Ms. Kirk's lost 
alimony during their marriage. 
(See also, Carter v. Carter, 656 S.W.2d 257 (Ky. App. 1983) (Oral antenuptial 
agreement unenforceable after the original written antenuptial contract was torn up). 
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The drafters of the Restatement, Second, Contracts, at §124, comment d, 
support the application of a strict policy with respect to antenuptial agreements as 
follows: 
An oral contract between prospective spouses made upon 
consideration of marriage does not become enforceable merely because 
the marriage has take place in reliance on it, nor by virtue of 
subsequent action incident to the marriage relation, since the contrary 
rule would deprive the marriage provision of the Statute [of Frauds] of 
any significant effect. 
Even if the purported oral promise in the case was made, Mr. Kirk made it to 
apply only so long as the parties remained together, and not otherwise. Typical of 
oral promises ofttimes made by parties upon marriage is that of remaining married 
"until death do us part". Enforcement of such oral promise would preclude either 
spouse from terminating the marriage by divorce. Such preclusion would obviously 
be against public policy. Enforcement of the purported oral promise in this matter 
would be equally contrary to public policy. 
As a matter of policy analysis, it should be obvious that there are sound 
reasons for requiring specific formalities to be observed, such as written memoranda, 
acknowledgment by written signature, and so on, before antenuptial agreements will 
be enforced. Apart from the possibility of fraud and perjury, which exists regarding 
all contracts, not just antenuptial agreements, there is the fact that parties who are 
contemplating marriage and making agreements in consideration thereof are not 
prone to deal with each other as ordinary prudent business people do. Their memory 
of unrecorded promises will be heavily affected by their emotions. 
Especially in Utah, where, a) the necessity of fault grounds for divorce, and b) 
heart balm causes of action, have both been abolished, it would be somewhat 
anomalous to allow unrecorded antenuptial agreements to be enforced as a general 
rule. Lest subjectivity subvert the order and reasonableness which a strictly enforced 
rule promotes, doubt should be resolved strictly in favor of application of the Statue 
of Frauds. 
The evidence relating to Mr. Kirk's purported promise to financially take care 
of Ms. Kirk upon their marriage is in dispute as shown by Mr. Kirk's testimony cited 
above. Further, the evidence supports and the Trial Court foxmd, that the parties 
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continued to manage their financial affairs separately during the marriage. Thus, 
there was not even partial performance to show the promise was made. Also, the 
alleged promise was never reduced to a written form signed by the parties. It would 
be a gross injustice to require alimony from Mr. Kirk based on the disputed oral 
promise. Yet, the Trial Court based a majority of its rationale in awarding alimony 
on this purported promise of Mr. Kirk. The Trial Court abused its discretion as a 
matter of law in doing so. 
Prenuptial agreements are required to be written and subscribed under Utah 
Code Section 25-5-4(3). The Trial Court's reliance in making its alimony award on 
Mr. Kirk's disputed oral promise that he would financially replace Ms. Kirk's lost 
alimony is contrary to Section 25-5-4. Such a promise does not meet the evidentiary 
burden required by the Statute of Frauds and is therefore unenforceable. The Trial 
Court thus, abused its discretion and erred as a matter of law in making the award 
on such basis. This Court should vacate the alimony award insofar as it is predicated 
on Mr. Kirk's purported oral promise. 
C. THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN AWARDING ALIMONY BASED 
ON A COMBINED STANDARD OF LIVING IN THAT THE 
PARTIES NEVER ESTABLISHED NOR EXPERIENCED SUCH 
A STANDARD DURING THEIR SHORT ONE YEAR 
MARRIAGE. 
The parties herein lived together from June 1,1991 to May 31,1992, a period 
of only twelve months. During their entire marriage, they kept separate control over 
their assets and income, and separate responsibility for their expenses. 
The first six months, June to December, 1991, they lived in Ms. Kirk's rental 
apartment. Ms. Kirk continued to make the rental payments, utilities and paid her 
separate expenses and debts while Mr. Kirk paid his personal expenses. 
The last six months, they lived in Mr. Kirk's residence. He continued to pay 
his separate expenses while Ms. Kirk continued to use her First Interstate checking 
account for income deposits and her personal expenditures. 
Thus, the evidence as to the parties' combined standard of living was not 
established due to the fact that each party kept and maintained his or her own 
separate accounts. 
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A number of decisions by this court and the Utah Supreme Court indicate that 
a requisite condition for an alimony award include a finding concerning the parties' 
combined standard of living. (See Rudman v. Rudman, 812 P.2d 73, 76 (Ut. App. 
1991), Munns v. Munns, 790 P.2d 116,121 (Ut. App. 1990), Morgan v. Morgan, 795 
P.2d 684, 689 (Ut. App. 1990), Throckmorton v. Throckmorton, 767 P.2d 121, 124 
(Ut. App. 1988), Eames v. Eames, 735 P.2d 395, 397 (Ut. App. 1987), and Paffel v. 
Paffel, 732 P.2d 96, 100-01 (Utah 1986)) 
In the instant case, the parties did not combine their income in any way for the 
purpose of meeting expenses. Each party kept their income and expenses separate 
during their brief one year relationship. Yet, the Trial Court's Findings of Fact 
provide in Paragraph 37: "In considering the amount of permanent alimony that 
should be paid to the plaintiff [sic, should read defendant], the Court has taken into 
account...the life style in which the parties lived during the course of the marriage, 
even though it was short." 
In Paragraph 39 of its findings, the Trial Court states: 
The Court finds that defendant's reasonable monthly Uving 
expenses are $2,287 as reflected in her Exhibit D-25, which the Court 
accepts and finds to be reasonable based upon the standard of living of 
the parties during their marriage and the standard of living of the 
defendant prior to her marriage to plaintiff. 
Yet, neither the Trial Court in its findings, nor the evidence presented to it, 
indicate; that the parties participated in any combined monetary standard of living 
whatsoever to which a certain monetary sum was ascribed. Neither did the Trial 
Court make any finding based on a dollar figure concerning Ms. Kirk's standard of 
living prior to the parties' marriage. 
The only standard of Uving the parties experienced during the marriage was 
their separate ability to support themselves as they had done prior to their marriage. 
They kept their income and expenses separate during their short one year 
relationship. Thus, an alimony award of any amount is unjust in this case, given 
that the parties experienced no combined standard of living dxiring their brief 
relationship. The alimony award should be vacated in so far as it was premised upon 
a combined standard of living, which standard is absent in the record. 
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D. THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN FAILING TO FULLY 
RECOGNIZE THE RELEVANCE OF THE PARTIES' VERY 
BRIEF MARRIAGE OF LESS THAN ONE YEAR IN MAKING 
ITS ALIMONY AWARD. 
In its Findings of Fact the Trial Court accurately noted, "This is a marriage of 
relatively short duration, approximately one year. (Findings of Fact, first sentence 
of Para. 5) Yet, it further found, "that defendant is entitled to permanent alimony 
from plaintiff* even though the marriage was of short duration," and "[i]n considering 
the amount of permanent alimony that should be paid to the plaintiff [sic, should 
read defendant] the Court has taken into account...it was short." (Findings of Fact, 
towards the end of Paragraph 37) 
A review of other cases and the literature dealing with very short marriages 
such as the instant matter, indicate that an award of $1,000 per month permanent 
alimony was an abuse of discretion. 
In Frank v. Frank, 419 P.2d 199 (Utah 1966) the Court dealt with a marriage 
of like duration as the instant matter. While Mr. Frank challenged an alimony 
award of $200 per month for three years, the Court stated, 
We think the trial court arrived at an equitable conclusion in case 
of a very short-lived marriage. The record indicates that on believable 
evidence, neither party was in a very much different position financially 
before and after the fortunate or unfortunate walk to the alter. 
Neither are the parties in this matter in very much different position, either 
prior to or after the marriage or following their divorce. 
In Delatore v. Delatore, 680 P.2d 27 (Utah 1984), the Court acknowledged the 
important relevancy of a "marriage of short duration" (3 & 1/2 years) in the 
determination of an equitable alimony award: $200 per month for 24 months. 
In McDonald v. McDonald, 236 P.2d 1066, 1070 (Utah 1951) the Court points 
out that "[t]he time of duration of the marriage" is a "helpful" factor in the 
determination of alimony. 
Likewise, in Wilson v. Wilson, 296 P.2d 977, 979 (Utah 1956) the Court stated 
that in determining alimony, "it is necessary for the court to consider...the duration 
of the marriage...." (emphasis added) 
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In Boyle v. Boyle, 735 P.2d 669, 671 (Ut. App. 1987), the Court noted that the 
Trial Court's findings, "include the following language:" 
That this was not a long term marriage, and the court feels that 
each party is being restored to the condition which existed at the time 
of the marriage, and therefor no alimony should be awarded. (Emphasis 
added) 
Likewise, where the parties marriage herein lasted only a year and they were 
both substantially "restored to the condition which existed at the time of the 
marriage," no alimony should have been awarded. 
After reiterating the well known factors "to be examined in determining 
alimony" contained in Jones v. Jones, 700 P.2d 1072 (Utah 1985) the Boyle Court 
further states at 671: 
In Jones the Court examined the record for an analysis of the 
criteria, and considered among other things, the length of the marriage, 
and the recipient spouse's education and employability. The Jones 
analysis process made it clear that the three pronged criterion does not 
preclude considering factors such as the length of the marriage in 
awarding alimony. (Emphasis added) 
Decision by Courts in other jurisdictions concur with and expand the above 
analysis in regards to the relevancy of marriage brevity in considering alimony. In 
Grimes v. Grimes, 472 S.W.2d 477, 478 (Ky. Ct. App. 1971), the Court stated, 
We thoroughly agree with the argument of the appellant that the 
brevity of their marriage should be considered in determining the 
amount of the alimony. Especially is this so where the parties come 
under the category of mature citizens with no hope of having a family, 
where in many instances, the parties are lonely and searching for 
companionship. See 1 A.L.R.3d 6 §7(c) 
In the instant matter, not only was the marriage very short, the parties are 
both mature citizens, with no plan of having more children, and were both searching 
for companionship to replace their loneliness. 
The above noted A.L.R. reference in Grimes deals with, "Duration of marriage", 
and includes the following: 
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It has been said in a treatise on divorce: "The length of the 
marriage is an important element which courts take into account in 
awarding alimony. Obviously the longer a woman has lived with a man 
and performed the functions which one normally expects from a wife, 
the greater is her claim on him. To hold otherwise is to put the 
golddigger, who marries a man for his money and then divorces him as 
fast as she can get rid of him, on par with a woman who has spent most 
of her adult years looking after a husband11 (emphasis added) [Quoting, 
Ploscowe, The Truth About Divorce (1955) p. 193] 
The Trial Court's alimony award in this case equates Ms. Kirk to a woman who 
has foregone career opportunities, raised children of the marriage, and functioned 
solely in a domestic role for numerous years. Ms. Kirk did none of these things 
during the brief one year marriage. The $1000 per month permanent alimony award 
is tantamount to an undeserved and unmerited life-time annuity. 
Likewise, Utah's sister state, Arizona, recognized in Oppenheimer v. 
Oppenheimer, 526 P.2d 762, 766 (Ariz. App. 1974): 
While the length of the marriage is an important consideration, 
its importance stems from two underlying considerations: The 
contribution of the spouse to be supported and judicial resistance to 
awarding spousal maintenance to a "golddigger". See Annot. 1 A.L.R.3d 
6, 32 (1965) (emphasis added) 
Ms. Kirk contributed nothing of the kind usually contributed by a spouse in a 
long term marriage. In no way did Ms. Kirk relinquish career opportunities, nor 
perform the long term domestic tasks normally associated with a permanent alimony 
award of $1,000 per month. The Trial Court abused its discretion in its alimony 
award by effectively rewarding Ms. Kirk a gold mine in ending the marriage 
relationship. 
Though the Trial Court acknowledged the brevity of the parties' one year 
marriage, it failed to give the short one year duration adequate consideration in 
awarding alimony. Such award, given the short duration of the marriage, 
inappropriately rewards Ms. Kirk as a "golddigger", with an undeserved gold mine. 
The alimony award should be reversed and remanded with instructions to 
appropriately consider the limitations on alimony in view of the brevity of the 
marriage. 
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II. THE TRIAL COURT ABUSED ITS DISCRETION IN MAKING ITS 
AWARD OF ATTORNEY FEES AND COSTS. 
On several occasions, this Court has set forth the basis to determine whether 
or not an award of attorney fees is justified: 
To be entitled to an award of attorney fees, the requesting spouse must make 
"a showing of financial need and reasonableness" of the fees incurred. Burt v. Burt, 
799 P.2d 166, 1171 (Ut. App. 1990). 
A number of other cases, mention the aforesaid criteria and further specify the 
following list of factors which need to be considered by the trial court in determining 
the reasonableness factor of attorneys fees: 
1) The difficulty of the litigation, 
2) The necessity and reasonableness of the number of hours spent on the case, 
3) The fee customarily charged in the locality for similar services, and 
4) The result obtained. 
(See Bell v. Bell, 810 P.2d 489, 493-4 (Ut. App. 1991), Morgan v. Morgan, 795 
P.2d 684, 688 (Ut. App. 1990), Haumont v. Haumont, 793 P.2d 421, 425-6 (Ut. App. 
1990), Sorensen u. Sorensen, 769 P.2d 820,832 (Ut. App. 1989), Rasband u. Rasband, 
752 P.2d 1331,1336 (Ut. App. 1988), and Kerr v. Kerr, 610 P.2d 1380, 1384-5 (Utah 
1980)) 
In Bell, at 494, this Court further stated, 
To permit meaningful review of the trial court's discretionary 
ruling, "[w]e have consistently encouraged trial court to make findings 
to explain the factors which they considered relevant in arriving at an 
attorney fee award." (citations omitted) 
Also in Bell, at 494, this Court pointed out that a significant factor in attorney 
fee determination is which party prevailed on the main disputed issue in the case. 
In Houmont, at 426, this Court noted, "If either financial need or 
reasonableness has not been shown, we have reversed awards of attorney fees." 
(emphasis added) 
In Sorensen, at 832, this Court stated there was sufficient evidence to 
demonstrate Mrs. Sorensen's need, yet found "the proffered testimony insufficient to 
sustain the award of attorney fees, and therefore, we reverse." Mrs. Sorensen's 
counsel had proffered an exhibit reflecting the time spent and the rates charged. 
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Opposing "counsel stipulated that the proffer could be received, but expressly refused 
to stipulate to the "reasonableness of the fees." This Court reversed because of the 
lack of evidence on the four factors cited above to determine overall reasonableness. 
A. THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN DETERMINING MS. KIRK'S NEED 
FOR ATTORNEY FEES. 
The only testimony concerning Ms. Kirk's need for attorney fees is found at 
TV2:154 L13-21. Ms. Kirk simply testified that in hiring her counsel, she had "made 
some payments, but...haven't been able to pay it all." 
Ms. Kirk's Financial Declaration shows she owns a condominium in Arizona. 
She claims it does not generate a positive cash flow, yet admits its value of 
$80,000.00 and having roughly $60,000.00 in equity. Certainly this equity, nearly ten 
times the award of her fees and costs, could be easily used to satisfy obligations to 
her counsel. 
As noted above, during the nine month trial proceeding, Ms. Kirk was easily 
able to pay $$517.21 per month to her counsel. Said sum is the average she paid as 
reflected on her Exhibit 34, shown herein as Exhibit "I". In addition, while claiming 
to have a $685.00 shortfall between her income and expenses, she not only met all 
her expenses, but increased the total balance in her checking account by $2,588.51 
to almost $8,000.00 while the underlying matter proceeded to trial. 
There is no reason given this increase, the near $8,000.00 available to her, and 
her ability to have averaged $517.21 per month in fee payment for nine months, that 
she could not pay the $6,565.05 fee balance she owed. In addition, as argued above, 
the aforementioned evidence supports that during the nine months preceding the 
trial, Ms. Kirk averaged either a) over $1,200 per month income from undisclosed 
sources, b) inflated her actual expenses by approximately $1,200 per month, or c) a 
combination of the forgoing two aspects. She could continue paying $517.00 per 
month and satisfy her attorney fees and costs in just one year. 
B. THE TRIAL COURT ERRED WHERE MS. KIRK FAILED TO 
ADEQUATELY DEMONSTRATE THE REASONABLENESS OF HER 
ATTORNEY FEE BASED ON FOUR REQUIRED FACTORS 
DISCUSSED BELOW: 
The Trial Court made no findings on the four required factors discussed below. 
The only findings on attorney fees and costs are found in the first half of Paragraph 
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51 and all of 52. Those findings are conclusory only. The findings'language merely 
makes conclusions on the issues of need, ability and reasonableness. Thus, the 
findings are inadequate on their face. 
1. THE DIFFICULTY OF THE LITIGATION 
This case was not so complex or difficult as to merit a rate of $175.00 per hour 
and a total fee of $11,229.97. This is particularly so when considering the result Ms. 
Kirk obtained, which factor is treated separately below. Thus, the reasonableness 
factor is not supported since the case was actually straightforward and relatively 
simple. The case was not complex nor difficult. The Trial Court only disagreed with 
Mr. Kirk on the issues of alimony and attorneys fees — issues which are not 
inordinately difficult. Mr. Kirk of course, now seeks to have this court overturn the 
Trial Court's decision on those two issues. 
2. THE NECESSITY AND REASONABLENESS OF THE NUMBER 
OF HOURS SPENT ON THE CASE. 
Defendant's Exhibit 34, Exhibit "I" herein, provides no break down of how the 
billable time was spent. It simply reflects a total of hours allegedly spent by Ms. 
Kirk's counsel, two associates and a paralegal. Included in paralegal time is 30.65 
hours at $50.00 per hour. Nothing is provided as to what work the paralegal 
allegedly performed during the 30.65 hours at a $50.00 per hour rate. No time logs 
were submitted to support and specify how the time was spent. Thus, it is a mere 
guess as to whether or not the time was necessary or reasonable. 
3. THE FEE CUSTOMARILY CHARGED IN THE LOCALITY FOR 
SIMILAR SERVICES. 
Though Ms. Kirk's counsel proffered that his "fees are $175.00 an hour," 
nothing was mentioned comparing this to the fee customarily charged in the locality 
for similar services. Such a comparison is required under Rasband, Bell, Morgan, 
Houmont, Kerr, and Sorrensen. The Trial Court erred in failing to compare and 
justify Ms. Kirk's counsel's fee to the significantly lower fee which is customarily 
charged. 
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4. THE RESULT OBTAINED. 
The Trial Court seriously erred in awarding attorney fees and costs to Ms. Kirk 
when considering the result obtained. As noted above, this Court in Rasband, Bell, 
Morgan, Houmont, Kerr, and Sorrensen, specifically stated that "the result obtained" 
is a major deciding factor in the determination of whether or not attorneys fees are 
reasonable. 
The major issue between the parties in this matter decided at trial was the 
division of property. In Paragraph 9 of its findings the Trial Court noted, "The 
defendant asserts that...she is entitled to one-half of all the properties that were 
designated to be included in the Kirk Family Trust." 
In Defendant's Exhibit 12, "Proposed distribution of assets and Liabilities," Ms. 
Kirk claimed that she was entitled to the sum of $242,493 from Mr. Kirk to equalize 
the parties' values and realize her claim of one-half of the parties' property. The 
Trial Court firmly rejected her claim, noting that both parties' premarital property 
had been kept separate during their marriage and had never been commingled in a 
prenuptial agreement by way of the Trust, which Trust was created solely as an 
estate planning device. 
By far the majority of the discovery, pre-trial preparation, testimony - including 
supporting exhibits, and the trial memoranda, dealt with Ms. Kirk's claim for a sum 
equal to one-half of the parties' property. An inspection of both parties' Trial 
Memoranda and Ms. Kirk's Reply Memorandum, the trial exhibits, and the 
transcripts, support that approximately 85% of Ms. Kirk's fees were likely consumed 
in advancing her property division claim, the issue upon which she failed to obtain 
the result sought. 
The Trial Memoranda are a good representation of what percentage of time 
was consumed by the division of property issue. An inspection of Mr. Kirk's 
Memorandum (R.O.A. 60-81) show 16 pages (4-19) of the 19 pages (4-22) under the 
Argument section addressing the property division issue. Ms. Kirk's Trial 
Memorandum (R.O.A. 114-124 of Case No. 92490 1796) shows 6 pages (3-8) of the 8 
pages (3-10) under the Argument section addressing the property division issue. Ms. 
Kirk's Reply Memorandum (R.O.A. 84-89) shows all 6 of its 6 pages addressing the 
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same issue. Of the 33 pages contained under the Argument sections in the three 
Memoranda, 28 pages were consumed with addressing the property division issue. 
The 28 pages addressing solely this issue equals 85% of the 33 pages. 
The Transcript of the summary argument held after trial on March 23, 1993 
is also illustrative of the same percentage. Coimsel argued the property division, 
alimony and attorney fee issues on pages 3 - 57 therein, 55 pages in total. The 
property division issue consumes 45 pages, (3-27,33-43, and 49-47) while the alimony 
and attorney fee issues take up only 10 pages (28-32 and 44-48). The 45 pages on 
property division equals 82% of the 55 page total. 
Yet, notwithstanding the Trial Court's agreement with Mr. Kirk on this major 
issue which consumed roughly 80% of the fees incurred in the proceedings below, 
Paragraph 51 of the Trial Court's findings state, 
Defendant seeks an award of attorney's fees from plaintiff on the 
basis that she is in need of assistance financially to meet those 
attorney's fee obligations and that the plaintiff has the ability to assist 
her in connection therewith. The Court is satisfied that the plaintiff 
ought to be required to assist the defendant in meeting her attorney's 
fee obligation not only for the reasons suggested by the defendant, that 
is her need and the plaintiffs ability to pay, but based upon the 
unreasonable approach that plaintiff has taken to the resolution of this 
case, (emphasis added) 
Mr. Kirk contended since the inception of this case that it was reasonable and 
appropriate that each party have awarded to them the property they each owned 
prior to their marriage. He argued that all their premarital property had been kept 
separate during the marriage. More than 80% of the underlying proceedings dealt 
with discovery, trial preparation, and testimony relating to the property division 
issue. The Trial Court agreed with Mr. Kirk. He prevailed on the major disputed 
issue in this matter. Clearly the majority of the time spent by Ms. Kirk's coimsel in 
disputing this issue resulted in a denial of the relief she sought. 
Ms. Kirk should not be awarded attorneys fees which were accumulated by 
spending more than 80% of attorney/paralegal time on an unmerited claim. The Trial 
Court erred in finding Mr. Kirk to be unreasonable when he prevailed on the major 
issue before the Court. The Trial Court further erred in awarding attorneys fees on 
the basis of Mr. Kirk purported "imreasonable approach". The result obtained on the 
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major issue at trial does not merit an award of attorney fees to Ms. Kirk. Ms. Kirk's 
unreasonable approach to the property division issue likely cost Mr. Kirk more than 
80% of his attorney fees which he otherwise would not have incurred. 
C. THE MERE PROFFER BY MS. KIRK'S COUNSEL AS TO HER 
ATTORNEYS FEES AND COSTS IS INSUFFICIENT TO SUPPORT 
THE EVIDENCE REQUIRED ON THE FOUR ABOVE FACTORS. 
Instead of providing evidence in relation to the above four factors, Ms. Kirk's 
counsel simply made a "proffer on attorney fees" submitting Defendant's Exhibit 34, 
herein Exhibit "I", as evidence thereof. (TV2:208 L4 to 210 Lll ) When asked by the 
Trial Court if Mr. Kirk's counsel had "[a]ny abjection to a proffer?" he responded, "I 
don't have any objection to the proffer with the usual admonishment to the Court 
that by accepting the proffer, we do not admit that Mr. Kirk should be obligated for 
the same." The Trial Court then replied, "I take that as a given." Thus, the evidence 
of Ms. Kirk's attorney fees is clearly inadequate under Sorrensen concerning proffered 
testimony on such fees. 
Without the required evidence in support of the four specific factors addressed 
above, the proffer is insufficient to support reasonableness under Sorrensen and the 
other cases cited above requiring such evidence. Ms. Kirk's counsel's mere proffer 
that "the number of hours invested in this case were appropriate and reasonable" 
(TV2:209 L9-10), does not make them so. Any attorney would certainly proffer a 
belief that the time spent on every case was reasonable. Ms. Kirk's counsel's mere 
proffer as to fee reasonableness is inadequate, just as the mere testimony, without 
supporting evidence as to expenses by a spouse requesting alimony, is inadequate 
under Baker v. Baker, 866 P.2d 540, 546-7 (Ut. App. 1993) discussed above on the 
alimony issue. 
D. THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN AWARDING MS. KIRK'S FEES 
TWICE. 
the Trial Court mistakingly counted Ms. Kirk's costs twice. Such error shows 
the undue hastiness in which the feeble evidence contained in Exhibit "I" herein was 
accepted. The Exhibit states, "Total Costs Advanced: $592.47". That total is also 
included in the "Total Services and Costs: $11,229.97". At the bottom of the Exhibit 
it provides, "Total Balance Due: $6,565.05". The balance includes what Ms. Kirk 
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owed on both attorney fees and costs. Yet, the Trial Court obviously misinterpreted 
this Exhibit and awarded the costs as though they were in addition to the Total 
Balance Due of $6565.05. The Trial Court's findings in Paragraph 52 state, 
The Court determines those attorney's fees to be $6565, the 
amount still due Mr. Dart after partial payment by the defendant 
herein. The Court further determines that the defendant is entitled to 
reimbursement of her legitimate costs incurred in this matter and as 
reflected in the exhibit attached to [actually included in] defendant's 
Exhibit D-34, in the total amount of $592.47. 
The above finding obviously counted Ms. Kirk's costs twice, once in the Total 
Balance Due and once separately. The Trial Court erred in counting Ms. Kirk's costs 
in the double fashion. 
Summary on attorneys fees and costs 
The award of attorney fees and costs is unjustified. Ms. Kirk did not have 
need of the award where she was able to a) meet all her alleged expenses including 
her unsubstantiated $685 per month shortfall, and b) pay her coimsel an average of 
$517.21 per month during the nine month trial proceeding, and c) increase her bank 
balance by $2,588.51 to a total of almost $8,000. Her bank balance is obviously 
sufficient to meet the $6,565 balance owed to her coimsel. She also has close to 
$60,000.00 equity available in her condominium to satisfy her fees. 
Further, the attorney fee and cost award is unjustified where she failed to 
show the reasonableness thereof under the required factors of 1) the difficulty of the 
litigation, 2) the necessity and reasonableness of the number of hours spent on the 
case, 3) the fee customarily charged in the locality for similar services, and 
particularly 4) the result obtained. Also, the mere proffer by Ms. Kirk's counsel is 
insufficient to support the necessary evidence on the aforesaid four factors. 
Ms. Kirk likely incurred at least 80% of her attorney fees arguing her 
unmerited property division claim. Mr. Kirk likely incurred an equal percentage of 
his attorney fees in defending against her unmerited claim. The Trial Court agreed 
with Mr. Kirk's position concerning the property division issue, which issue consumed 
by far the majority of both parties' attorney fee expenses for discovery, trial 
preparation and the trial itself. 
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The Trial Court incorrectly included Ms. Kirk's $592.47 in costs twice - once 
separately and once included in the attorney fee award. 
Thus, where neither Ms. Kirk's need for attorneys fees and costs, nor the 
reasonableness of such fees and costs were shown, the award of the fees and costs, with 
the costs counted twice, is clearly erroneous and should be reversed and vacated. In 
the alternative, the award should be reversed and remanded to assess her need in light 
of the $1,200 discrepancy, her bank balance, and her condominium equity, along with 
instruction to assess beyond a mere proffer the four factors discussed above. 
CONCLUSION 
This Court should a) reverse and vacate because the findings are clearly 
erroneous, or b) reverse and remand the award of alimony, attorneys fees, and costs 
as requested in the italics portion at the conclusion of each section above. 
The alimony award should be reversed and vacated, or reversed and remanded, 
on the following factors: 
a) Ms. Kirk's need, 
b) Ms. Kirk's ability to provide sufficient income for herself, 
c) Mr. Kirk's ability to pay, 
d) The replacement theory is error of law, 
e) Enforcement of the purported oral promise is contrary to the Statute of 
Frauds, 
f) The parties never established nor experienced a combined standard of 
living, and 
g) Adequate consideration of the brevity of the marriage. 
The award of attorneys fees and costs should be reversed and vacated, or 
reversed and remanded, on the following factors: 
a) Ms. Kirk's need, 
b) Ms. Kirk's ability to pay, 
c) Mr. Kirk's ability to pay, 
d) The reasonableness of the fees and costs considering: 
1) The difficulty of the litigation, 
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2) The necessity and reasonableness of the number of hours spent 
on the case, 
3) The fee customarily charged in the locality for similar services, 
and 
4) The result obtained, 
e) The mistake of awarding Ms. Kirk's fees twice. 
Respectfully submitted this day of June, 1994. 
Jimi Mitsunaga 
Attorney for Plaintifl/Appellant 
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25-5-4. Certain agreements void unless written 
and signed. 
The following agreements are void unless the 
agreement, or some note or memorandum of the 
agreement, is in writing, signed by the party to be 
charged with the agreement: 
(1) every agreement that by its terms is not to 
be performed within one year from the making of 
the agreement; 
(2) every promise to answer for the debt, de-
fault, or miscarriage of another; 
(3) every agreement, promise, or undertaking 
made upon consideration of marriage, except mu-
tual promises to marry; 
(4) every special promise made by an executor 
or administrator to answer in damages for the 
liabilities, or to pay the debts, of the testator or 
intestate out of his own estate; 
(5) every agreement authorizing or employing 
an agent or broker to purchase or sell real estate 
for compensation; 
(6) every credit agreement. 
(a) As used in Subsection (6): 
(i) "Credit agreement" means an 
agreement by a financial institution to 
lend, delay, or otherwise modify an obli-
gation to repay money, goods, or things 
in action, to otherwise extend credit, or 
to make any other financial accommoda-
tion. "Credit agreement" does not in-
clude the usual and customary agree-
ments related to deposit accounts or 
overdrafts or other terms associated 
with deposit accounts or overdrafts. 
(ii) "Creditor" means a financial insti-
tution which extends credit or extends a 
financial accommodation under a credit 
agreement with a debtor. 
(iii) "Debtor" means a person who 
seeks or obtains credit, or seeks or re-
ceives a financial accommodation, under 
a credit agreement with a financial in-
stitution. 
(iv) "Financial institution" means p 
state or federally chartered bank, sav-
ings and loan association, savings bank, 
industrial loan corporation, credit 
union, or any other institution under the 
jurisdiction of the commissioner of Fi-
nancial Institutions as provided in Title 
7, Financial Institutions Act of 1981. 
(b) A debtor or a creditor may not main-
tain an action on a credit agreement unless 
the agreement is in writing, expresses con-
sideration, sets forth the relevant terms and 
conditions, and is signed by the party 
against whom enforcement of the agreement 
would be sought. For purposes of this act, a 
signed application constitutes a signed 
agreement, if the creditor does not customar-
ily obtain an additional signed agreement 
from the debtor when granting the applica-
tion. 
(c) The following actions do not give rise 
to a claim that a credit agreement is created, 
unless the agreement satisfies the require-
ments of Subsection (b): 
(i) the rendering of financial advice 
by a creditor to a debtor; 
(ii) the consultation by a creditor with 
a debtor; or 
(iii) the creation for any purpose be-
tween a creditor and a debtor of fidu-
ciary or other business relationships 
(d) Each credit agreement shall contain a 
clearly stated typewritten or printed provi-
sion giving notice to the debtor that the writ-
ten agreement is a final expression of the 
agreement between the creditor and debtor 
and the written agreement may not be con-
tradicted by evidence of any alleged oral 
agreement. The provision does not have to be 
on the promissory Bote or other evidence of 
indebtedness that is tied to the credit agree-
ment. 1W9 
ing the course of the action or in the final order or 
judgment. 1993 
30-3-3. Award of costs, attorney and witness 
fees — Temporary alimony. * 
(1) In any action filed under Title 30, Chapter 3, 4, 
or 6, and in any action to establish an order of cus-
tody, visitation, child support, alimony, or division of 
property in a domestic case, the court may order a 
party to pay the costs, attorney fees, and witness fees, 
including expert witness fees, of the other party to 
enable the other party to prosecute or defend the ac-
tion. The order may include provision for costs of the 
action. 
(2) In any action to enforce an order of custody, 
visitation, child support, alimony, or division of prop-
erty in a domestic case, the court may award costs 
and attorney fees upon determining that the party 
substantially prevailed upon the claim or defense. 
The court, in its discretion, may award no fees or 
limited fees against a party if the court finds the 
party is impecunious or enters in the record the rea-
son for not awarding fees. 
(3) In any action listed in Subsection (1), the court 
may order a party to provide money, during the pen-
dency of the action, for the separate support and 
maintenance of the other party and of any children in 
the custody of the other party. 
(4) Orders entered under this section prior to entry 
of the final order or judgment may be amended dur-
30-3-5. Disposition of property — Maintenance 
and health care of parties and children 
— Division of debts — Court to have 
continuing jurisdiction — Custody and 
visitation — Termination of alimony — 
Nonmeritorious petition for modifica-
tion — Meritorious petition for modifi-
cation [Effective until January 1,1994]. 
(1) When a decree of divorce is rendered, the court 
may include in it equitable orders relating to the chil-
dren, property, debts or obligations, and parties. The 
court shall include the following in every decree of 
"divorce: 
(a) an order assigning responsibility for the 
payment of reasonable and necessary medical 
and dental expenses of the dependent children; 
(b) if coverage is available at a reasonable 
cost, an order requiring the purchase and main-
tenance of appropriate health, hospital, and den-
tal care insurance for the dependent children; 
and 
(c) pursuant to Section 15-4-6.5: 
(i) an order specifying which party is re-
sponsible for the payment of joint debts, obli-
gations, or liabilities of the parties con-
tracted or incurred during marriage; 
(ii) an order requiring the parties to notify 
respective creditors or obligees, regarding 
the court's division of debts, obligations, or 
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liabilities and regarding the parties' sepa-
rate, current addresses, and 
(in) provisions for the enforcement of 
these orders 
(2) The court may include, in an order determining 
child support, an order assigning financial responsi-
bility for all or a portion of child care expenses in-
curred on behalf of the dependent children, necessi-
tated by the employment or training of the custodial 
parent If the court determines that the circum-
stances are appropriate and that the dependent chil-
dren would be adequately cared for, it may include an 
order allowing the noncustodial parent to provide the 
day care for the dependent children, necessitated by 
the employment or training of the custodial parent 
(3) The court has continuing jurisdiction to make 
subsequent changes or new orders for the support and 
maintenance of the parties, the custody of the chil-
dren and their support, maintenance, health, and 
dental care, or the distribution of the property and 
obligations for debts as is reasonable and necessary 
(4) In determining visitation rights of parents, 
grandparents, and other members of the immediate 
family, the court shall consider the best interest of 
the child 
(5) Unless a decree of divorce specifically provides 
otherwise, any order of the court that a party pay 
alimony to a former spouse automatically terminates 
upon the remarriage of that former spouse However, 
if the remarriage is annulled and found to be void ab 
initio, payment of alimony shall resume if the party 
paying alimony is made a party to the action of an-
nulment and his rights are determined 
(6) Any order of the court that a party pay alimony 
to a former spouse terminates upon establishment by 
the party paying alimony that the former spouse is 
residing with a person of the opposite sex However, if 
it is further established by the person receiving ali-
mony that that relationship or association is without 
any sexual contact, payment of alimony shall resume 
(7) If a petition for modification of child custody or 
visitation provisions of a court order is made and de-
nied, the court shall order the petitioner to pay the 
reasonable attorney's fees expended by the prevailing 
party in that action, if the court determines that the 
petition was without merit and not asserted or de-
fended against in good faith 
(8) If a petition alleges substantial noncompliance 
with a visitation order by a parent, a grandparent, or 
other member of the immediate family pursuant to 
Section 78-32-12 2 where a visitation right has been 
previously granted by the court, the court may award 
to the prevailing party costs, including actual attor-
ney fees and court costs incurred by the prevailing 
party because of the other party's failure to provide or 
exercise court-ordered visitation 1993 
EXHIBIT "B" 
Third Judical Dltlriet* 
M A Y - 4 1993 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OP THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT 
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OP UTAH 
OTIS B. KIRX, JR., : MEMORANDUM DECISION 
Plaintiff, : CASE NO. 924901796 
vs. : 
PEGGIE M. KIRK : 
Defendant. : 
The above-referenced divorce action was before the Court in 
consolidated case number 924901709. Prior to the trial in this 
matter, the Court consolidated a companion case where the plaintiff 
had filed for divorce in number 924901796, treating the second 
filed lawsuit as a counterclaim in the original surviving action. 
Following the taking of evidence in this matter and closing 
arguments, the matter was submitted to the Court for decision. The 
Court took the matter under advisement to consider the testimony 
offered by the parties and their witnesses, the arguments of 
counsel both oral and written, and the legal authorities submitted 
by the parties in support of their respective positions. The Court 
has considered those matters, along with the documentary evidence 
received during the course of the trial, and being fully advised, 
enters the following Memorandum Decision. 
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INTRODUCTORY STATEMENT 
This is a marriage of relatively short duration, approximately 
one year. Both the plaintiff and the defendant had been married 
before the instant marriage. Plaintiff Otis B. Kirk, Jr. had, a 
short time before this marriage, lost his former wife as a result 
of her death. The defendant Peggie M. Kirk had been a friend of 
the plaintiff's deceased wife prior to and at the time of her 
death. At the time of the instant marriage, the defendant was 
divorced from her prior husband and was receiving permanent alimony 
in the sum of $800.00 per month. 
The plaintiff, after the death of his first wife, actively 
courted the defendant. It is undisputed that the plaintiff's 
courting of the defendant was aggressive. The defendant was 
reluctant to remarry, being concerned regarding her financial 
status. Both the plaintiff and the defendant are in their mid-
60's, and neither is actively employed. The defendant works part-
time on an irregular basis, earning little income. The plaintiff 
has substantial available income from his various premarital 
investments and retirement programs. 
Prior to the marriage the evidence supports the finding and 
the Court does find that the defendant while certainly not wealthy, 
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was financially comfortable and reasonably secure relating to her 
financial matters. 
The evidence is clear and the Court finds that when confronted 
with the defendant's reluctance to remarry for the reasons stated 
above, the plaintiff promised the defendant that she would not need 
to worry financially, that he would "take care of her" in a 
financial setting. In support of and to encourage the defendant to 
marry the plaintiff, the plaintiff revealed to the defendant his 
substantial financial holdings. On continued pressure to enter 
into a marriage relationship, the defendant ultimately was 
satisfied based upon the plaintiff's representations that 
remarriage at her stage of life under the circumstances then 
existing would not effect her financial stability, even though she 
would lose her permanent alimony. Based upon the foregoing, she 
agreed to marry the plaintiff. 
Following marriage, the parties lived in the defendant's 
apartment while the plaintiff remodeled his residence where he and 
his first wife lived for many years. After completion of the 
remodeling, the parties moved in to the remodeled residence and 
following a period of time their relationship deteriorated to a 
point of separation. 
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The position of the plaintiff is that all of the properties 
that he owned, both real, personal and financial accounts, are his 
sole and separate property and should be returned to him in this 
divorce proceeding. The plaintiff, while acknowledging that he 
made representations and promises to the defendant to induce her to 
enter into the marriage relationship, resists the defendant's 
claims that she is entitled to share in his premarital property. 
In addition to the plaintiff's position that all of the properties, 
real, personal and financial accounts that he either owned or 
inherited prior to his marriage to the defendant should be returned 
to him, the plaintiff also asserts that the defendant is not 
entitled to alimony, nor any of the other monetary considerations 
that she has requested, and rejects any suggestion that he should 
assist her in attorney's fees. 
The defendant asserts that as a result of the promises of the 
plaintiff to induce her to enter into the marriage relationship and 
as a result of the creation of the Kirk Family Trust, an exhibit in 
this matter, that she is entitled to one-half of all the properties 
that were designated to be included in the Kirk Family Trust. Some 
of the properties designated in the Kirk Family Trust were actually 
transferred to the Trust, some were not* 
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The defendant further asserts in the alternative that should 
the property of the plaintiff be determined by this Court to be 
premarital and not subject to division, that she is entitled to 
substantial alimony based upon the promises and representations of 
the plaintiff in view of what she gave up in the form of permanent 
alimony by agreeing to marry the plaintiff, as well as on the basis 
of need. The defendant also seeks miscellaneous expenses and sums 
that she attributes to the plaintiff's insistence that she enter 
into the marital relationship. The defendant requests an award of 
attorney's fees as well. 
RESIDENCY AND GROUNDS 
Based upon the testimony of the parties, the Court is 
satisfied that the requirements of residency have been established 
and that there exists sufficient grounds to terminate this marriage 
on the basis of irreconcilable differences. The divorce will be 
final upon the signing and entry of the final divorce Decree in 
this matter. 
PROPERTY DIVISION 
With the exception of a condominium in Arizona and other minor 
premarital property assets, the bulk of the real property and 
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financial assets in dispute in these proceedings were acquired by 
the plaintiff prior to the marriage between he and the defendant. 
After considering the relevant authorities, the written and oral 
arguments of the parties, the Court is satisfied, using the 
appropriate criteria announced by the appellate courts of this 
state, that the property held by the plaintiff, both real and 
personal, as well as the property held by the defendant, both real 
and personal, prior to the entry of the marriage ought to be 
returned to each as their sole and separate property. 
The Court is satisfied that to the extent the defendant makes 
claim against the defendant's premarital property, that the 
inclusion of some of the plaintiff's premarital property and the 
suggestion that a substantial additional amount would be included 
in the Kirk Family Trust does not change the character of the 
property from premarital or inherited property to that of joint 
property. Clearly, the plaintiff's property was accumulated either 
through premarital efforts or inheritance prior to his marriage to 
the defendant, as was the defendant's premarital properties. The 
Court is constrained to reject the proposition asserted by the 
defendant that the establishment of the Kirk Family Trust after the 
marriage constituted a prenuptial agreement for dissolution of the 
parties' assets should a divorce occur. To the contrary, the Court 
KIRK V. KIRK PAGE SEVEN MEMORANDUM DECISION 
is satisfied that the establishment of the Kirk Family Trust was an 
estate planning device and so contemplated by the parties. 
It does not appear to the Court and the Court does not find 
that there was ever a contemplated gift between the parties of 
their premarital assets, even though some of those assets of the 
plaintiff and a majority of the assets of the defendant were 
transferred into the aforementioned Trust. The Trust did not 
contemplate divorce, but rather provided for the respective parties 
should one predecease the other. For the reasons suggested by the 
plaintiff in his written materials, as well as those suggested by 
his counsel in oral argument, the Court rejects the position 
asserted by the defendant that she is entitled to one-half of the 
properties that were included in or designated to be included in 
the Kirk Family Trust. 
Any properties that have been transferred into the Kirk Family 
Trust are to be returned to the original owner to be held as that 
party's sole and separate property, based upon the determination of 
this Court that those properties are premarital and not subject to 
distribution in this divorce. 
ALIMONY 
While the Court has determined that the plaintiff's promises 
to the defendant are not sufficient to allow her to assert a legal 
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claim against the plaintiff's premarital properties, the Court is 
satisfied that the plaintiff's promises which induced the defendant 
to give up financial security are enforceable. The plaintiff made 
promises of financial security to the defendant to induce her to 
enter into the marriage relationship. The Court is satisfied that 
she would not have entered into the marital relationship except for 
the promises of the plaintiff that she would be reasonably 
financially secure should she agree to give up her sources of 
income in the form of permanent alimony from a prior spouse and 
enter into the marital relationship with the plaintiff. The 
plaintiff made a promise which he acknowledges. The promise was 
significant as far as the defendant was concerned, and the 
plaintiff ought to be held to his promise in all good conscience 
and in equity. This Court therefore determines that the defendant 
is entitled to permanent alimony from the plaintiff even though the 
marriage was of short duration. 
In considering the amount of permanent alimony that should be 
paid to the defendant, the Court has taken into account the limited 
ability of the defendant to earn income, her age, and her needs, as 
wellasthe style in which the parties lived during the course of 
the marriage, even though it was short. The defendant gave up a 
comfortable apartment, many of her personal pieces of property at 
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the insistence of the plaintiff, and of course gave up her 
permanent alimony income from her former husband. She has 
submitted expenses which she will be required to expend ongoing, 
which the Court finds reasonable. The defendant does, however, 
have income from social security which she did not have prior to 
the marriage. 
The plaintiff has substantial ability to assist the defendant 
in meeting her monthly expenses, and to provide for her financial 
well-being in accordance with his premarital promises. Over the 
years, the plaintiff has acquired substantial financial assets in 
the form of investments and retirements. He owns or is a mortgage 
holder on real properties. His own personal expenses are minimal 
by his own choice. Further by his own choice, the plaintiff does 
not draw against his retirement or other assets, even though he has 
the ability to do so. It is clear to the Court that the plaintiff 
has the financial ability to assist the defendant in the form of 
permanent alimony. 
Based upon the needs of the defendant and the financial 
abilities of the plaintiff, also based upon what the defendant gave 
up when entering into the marriage, and considering the promises 
made to the defendant by the plaintiff, and the reasonable needs of 
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the defendant, the Court is satisfied that an ongoing alimony 
requirement in the sum of $1,000.00 per month is necessary and 
reasonable. Alimony will continue until such time as it is 
terminated under the usual and customary circumstances. 
MISCELLANEOUS MATTERS 
The defendant by way of Exhibit 27 and other testimony has 
suggested that as a result of the demands of the plaintiff, she 
disposed of certain property that she owned and enjoyed prior to 
the marriage. The defendant has assigned a value to the property 
items listed on Exhibit 27 which, with the exception of the moving 
costs of separation, the Court finds are not the fair market value 
of the property. 
The personal properties identified, such as the washer and 
dryer, antique piano, dining room set, art work, and the sewing 
machine, were all given as gifts to the parties' children, and the 
amounts by way of value placed upon the individual pieces of 
property, with the exception of perhaps the antique piano, are not 
reflective of their current value. While it is undisputed that 
these items of personal property were given by the defendant to her 
children and the plaintiff's son at the time of the move into the 
remodeled home, the Court is unable to determine any legal or 
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equitable basis upon which the plaintiff ought to pay for the value 
of those properties. That would include the washer and dryer which 
was given to the plaintiff's son. In addition, the Court is unable 
to find any legal or equitable basis upon which the plaintiff 
should be required to reimburse the defendant for moving costs, and 
accordingly the sums sought by the defendant from the plaintiff as 
represented on Exhibit 27 are rejected by the Court. 
The defendant has requested certain items to be returned to 
her as listed on Exhibit 26. The plaintiff resists the return of 
some of the items. The Court is satisfied that to the extent that 
items 1 through 21 on Exhibit 26 are in the plaintiff's possession, 
they should be returned to the defendant forthwith. 
The plaintiff has suggested that he paid on behalf of the 
defendant certain sums prior to the marriage, and identified those 
in his testimony as medical treatment for the defendant, paying off 
defendant's obligation to Chase Visa, a medical bill at Cottonwood 
Center, and the purchase of a wedding ring for the defendant. The 
Court finds those to have been gifts from the plaintiff to the 
defendant, and to the extent that the plaintiff seeks reimbursement 
or credit in some other fashion for those amounts, that claim is 
rejected by the Court. 
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The defendant seeks an award of attorney's fees from the 
plaintiff on the basis that she is in need of assistance 
financially to meet those attorney's fee obligations, and that the 
plaintiff has the ability to assist her in connection therewith. 
The Court is satisfied that the plaintiff ought to be required to 
assist the defendant in meeting her attorney's fee obligation, not 
only for the reasons suggested by the defendant, that is, her need 
and the plaintiff's ability to pay, but based upon the unreasonable 
approach that the plaintiff has taken to the resolution of this 
case. 
Plaintiff's suggestion that the parties should be required to 
merely take what they brought into the marriage and walk away with 
no further financial obligations between them is disingenuous. 
This is particularly true in view of the aggressive nature of the 
courting of the defendant by the plaintiff, and his promises to her 
to induce her to enter into the marital relationship. While fault 
for the deterioration of the marriage is not an issue in this case, 
the Court is satisfied that for whatever reasons only known to the 
plaintiff, he apparently had second thoughts after the marriage 
regarding the propriety of his original conduct, and that that for 
the most part caused the dissolution of the relationship between 
the parties. 
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For those reasons, together with those suggested by the 
defendant, the Court is satisfied that the attorney's fees 
testified to by Mr. Dart are reasonable and were necessarily 
incurred in this case, and that the plaintiff should be required to 
pay to the defendant for the use and benefit of her attorney the 
sums proffered by Mr. Dart at the conclusion of the evidence in 
this case. The Court determines those attorney's fees to be 
$6,565.00, the amount still due Mr. Dart after partial payment by 
the defendant herein. The Court further determines that the 
defendant is entitled to reimbursement of her legitimate costs 
incurred in this matter. 
The parties' counsel are directed to collaborate in preparing 
Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law that would put into effect 
the decisions of this Court as contained in this Memorandum 
Decision. The Court would request that Mr. Dart take the 
responsibility for the initial draft, to be supplemented by Mr. 
Mitsunaga, particularly on the issue where Mr. Mitsunaga's client 
has prevailed, to wit: the issue of premarital property. Once the 
documents have been prepared and approved as to form, the Court 
would request that the Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law, and 
the final Decree be submitted to the Court for its review and 
signature and filing as may be appropriate. 
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To the extent that it is not otherwise indicated herein, the 
Court would require in the final papers that each party be required 
to execute the necessary documents of title or other evidence of 
ownership necessary to return the properties, both real and 
personal, to their individual owners. That would be a requirement 
imposed by the Court on the parties both in their individual 
capacity, as well as their capacity pr trustee under the Kirk 
Family Trust. / 
Dated this /day of May, X993-
,0^. 
'TIMOTHY R. HANSON 
DISTRICT COURT JUDG ATTEST 
Deputy Cte* 
00104 
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT 
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
000OOO000 
OTIS B. KIRK, JR., 
Plaintiff, 
v. 
PEGGIE M. KIRK, 
Defendant• 
FINDINGS OF FACT 
AND 
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
Civil No. 924901796DA 
Judge Timothy R. Hanson 
000OOO000 
The above-referenced divorce action was before the Court 
consolidated with case No. 92-4901709. Prior to the divorce in 
this matter the Court consolidated a companion case where the 
plaintiff had filed for divorce in case No. 92-4901796, treating 
the second filed law suit as a counterclaim in the original 
surviving action. 
Trial was held on the 9th day of March, 1993, with 
closing argument on the 23rd day of March, 1993. Following the 
talcing of evidence in this matter and closing arguments the matter 
was submitted to the Court for decision. The Court took this 
matter under advisement to consider the testimony offered by the 
parties and their witnesses, the arguments of counsel both oral and 
written and the legal authorities submitted by the parties in 
support of their respective positions. The Court has considered 
those matters along with the documentary evidence received during 
the course of the trial and being fully advised enters the 
following: 
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FINDINGS OF FACT 
1. Both plaintiff and defendant are residents of Salt 
Lake County, State of Utah, and have been for more than three 
months before the filing of this action and the Court is satisfied 
that the requirements of residency have been established* 
2. Plaintiff and defendant were married to each other 
in Jackson, Wyoming, on the 2nd day of June, 1991, and since that 
time have been husband and wife. 
3. Both parties testified to disagreements and 
arguments and a growing apart which resulted in their differences 
becoming irreconcilable. Each of the parties is entitled to a 
divorce on their respective Complaint and Counterclaim on the 
grounds of irreconcilable differences, to become final upon signing 
and entry. 
4. No children have been born as issue of this marriage 
and none are expected and there are no issues of child custody or 
child support. 
5. This is a marriage of relatively short duration, 
approximately one year. Both the plaintiff and the defendant had 
been married before the instant marriage. Plaintiff, Otis B. Kirk, 
Jr., had a short time before this marriage lost his former wife as 
a result of her death. The defendant, Peggie M. Kirk, had been a 
friend of the plaintiff's deceased wife prior to and at the time of 
death. At the time of the instant marriage the defendant was 
divorced from her prior husband and was receiving permanent alimony 
in the sum of $200 a week, or $860 per month. 
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The plaintiff after the death of his first wife 
actively courted the defendant. It is undisputed that the 
plaintiffs courting of the defendant was aggressive. The 
defendant was reluctant to marry being concerned regarding her 
financial status. Both the plaintiff and the defendant are in 
their mid-601s and neither is actively employed in any substantial 
way. The defendant works part-time on an irregular basis earning 
little income. The plaintiff has substantial available income from 
his various premarital investments and retirement programs. 
Prior to the marriage the evidence supports the 
finding and the Court does find that defendant while certainly not 
wealthy, was financially comfortable and reasonably secure relating 
to her financial matters. 
The evidence is clear and the Court finds that when 
confronted with the defendant's reluctance to remarry for the 
reasons stated above, that plaintiff promised the defendant that 
she would not need to worry financially, that he would take care of 
her in a financial setting. This promise was made under 
circumstances where she had shared with him her financial 
information and provided him with her tax returns going back 
several years. In support of and to encourage the defendant to 
marry the plaintiff, the plaintiff revealed to the defendant his 
substantial financial holdings. Both parties testified that just 
prior to the marriage they discussed and agreed to put all of their 
property into a trust for their mutual benefit so that what was his 
was hers and what was hers was his. On continued pressure to enter 
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into a marriage relationship, the defendant ultimately was 
satisfied based upon the plaintifffs representations that marriage 
at her stage in life under the circumstances then existing would 
not effect her financial stability even though she would lose her 
permanent alimony. Based on the foregoing, she agreed to marry the 
plaintiff. 
6, Shortly following the parties' marriage on June 2, 
1991, they entered into the execution of a Trust Agreement, 
introduced in evidence as Exhibit P-l. Schedule "A" of the Trust 
described the assets conveyed into the Trust which essentially 
included all of the assets of the parties. Following the execution 
of the Trust Agreement, some of the properties, including all of 
the real properties of the parties, the plaintiff's checking 
account with Valley Bank and Trust, account no. 02-3 0406-65 and a 
Franklin U.S. Government Securities Fund, account no. 10178837808 
were transferred into the Trust. While plaintiff promised that he 
would place the remaining assets into the Trust, those transfers 
never occurred as the plaintiff testified that he had not had time 
to do it. 
7. After the marriage, the parties lived in the 
defendant's apartment while the plaintiff remodeled his residence 
where he and his first wife had lived for many years. Defendant 
was actively involved in the remodeling process in providing color 
coordination advice and designer advice and some physical labor. 
After completion of the remodeling, the parties moved into the 
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remodeled residence and following a period of time their 
relationship deteriorated to the point of separation. 
8. The position of the plaintiff is that all of the 
properties that he owned, both real, personal and financial 
accounts, are his sole and separate property and should be returned 
to him in this divorce proceeding. The plaintiff, while 
acknowledging that he made representations and promises to the 
defendant to induce her to enter into the marriage relationship, 
resists the defendant's claim that she is entitled to share in his 
premarital property. In addition to the plaintiff's position that 
all of the properties, inherited prior to his marriage to the 
defendant should be returned to him, the plaintiff also asserts 
that the defendant is not entitled to alimony, nor any of the other 
monetary considerations that she has requested, and rejects any 
suggestion that he should assist her in attorney's fees. 
9. The defendant asserts that as a result of the 
promises of the plaintiff to induce her to enter into the marriage 
relationship and as a result of the creation of the Kirk Family 
Trust, an exhibit in this matter, that she is entitled to one-half 
of all the properties that were designated to be included in the 
Kirk Family Trust. Some of the properties designated in the Kirk 
Family Trust were actually transferred to the Trust, some were not. 
The defendant further asserts in the alternative 
that should the property of the plaintiff be determined by this 
Court to be premarital and not subject to division, that she is 
entitled to substantial alimony based upon the promises and 
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representations of the plaintiff in view of what she gave up in the 
form of permanent alimony by agreeing to marry the plaintiff, as 
well as on the basis of need. The defendant also seeks 
miscellaneous expenses and sums that she attributes to the 
plaintifffs insistence that she enter into the marital 
relationship. The defendant requests an award of attorney's fees 
as well. 
10. The plaintiff has acquired various and sundry items 
of property prior to the date of marriage. The following property, 
real and personal are: 
A. Residence: 3518 2000 East, Salt Lake City, Utah. 
This is a resident structure with 1.25 acres. 
It was purchased by the plaintiff and his deceased 
wife in 1956 and fully paid off in 1980. The 
property is now encumbered by a construction loan 
for approximately $59,000.00. 
B. Strip of land: This is a one foot wide protection 
strip granted by Salt Lake County and is adjacent 
and contiguous to the lot upon which the residence 
(paragraph 22(a) is situated and was purchased at 
the same*time. 
C. Lewis contract: This is a real estate contract on 
the sale of real property acquired by the plaintiff 
and his deceased wife in 1966. The real estate 
contract was entered into December 5, 1980. 
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Pensions and retirement (Monthly): 
(Legend: I, inherited from deceased wife, PMS, 
premarital source) 
Carpenter Union P/M/S $ 64.00 
Boise Cascade P/M/S 676.00 
U.S. West I 423.00 
Dividends - Interest (Monthly): 
Mountain American CU I 2.16 
Putnam IRA P/M/S 158.65 
Boise Cascade Supplemental Savings 631.40 
U.S. Government Security (Jt) 465.00 
Alliance Government Reserve (Jt) 2.30 
No. american Service Trusts 162.50 
Thomson Growth Fund (Jt) 0 
AT&T I 4.04 
Ameritech I 8.20 
Bell Atlantic I 11.34 
Bell South I 7.42 
NYNEX 11.37 
Pactel I 7.42 
South West Bell 7.66 
U.S. West I 41.38 
Social Security: 
Social Security P/M/S 869.00 
Valley bank checking P/M/S 
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This is the only checking account used by the 
plaintiff before and after the marriage. Two 
transfers were made by the plaintiff into 
this checking account: 
1. December 7, 1990 - monies from deceased wife's 
retirement $20,176.00 
2. Feb. 1991 - monies from deceased wife's 
retirement $14,269.66 














Mountain Credit Union I 
Putnam IRA P/M/S 
Putnam IRA Cash account 
Boise Cascade Supplemental 
Retirement JT 
Franklin U.S. Government 
Security Fund P/M/S 
U.S. government Securities -
North Am Service Trust P/M/S 
Alliance Government Reserve P/M/S 
Mainstay Family of Funds P/M/S 
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AT&T Stock I 
Ameritech I 
Bell Atlantic I 












15. Pactel I 40.7050 " 
16. Southwest Bell I 29.3840 ff 
17. U.S. West I 37.3090 ,f 
18. U.S.-West I 68.000 " 
19. U.S. West I 252.00 " 
I. Vehicles: (Inherited and pre-marital) 
1. 1980 Chevrolet 
2. 1981 Toyota 
3. 1968 Nomad Trailer 
4. 1975 Yamaha motorcycle 
11. Defendantf s Property: It is equally without 
dispute and uncontroverted that Ms. Kirk had the following pre-
marital property. 
1. Condominium 7018 No. Barbados 
in Phoenix, Arizona 
Market Value $80,000.00 
2. Household furniture and fixtures 
3. 1983 Lincoln Continental Mark VT 
4. First Interstate, checking account 
#21-28727-1 66.53 
5. First Interstate checking 
#28-16407-7 Balance 9,537.00 
"Peggie M. Kirk11 
"Otis B.^Kirk" 
12. The aforesaid properties described in Paragraph 10 
and Paragraph 11 were acquired by each as indicated prior to the 
instant marriage and without any contribution of either spouse to 
the other and absent any efforts of either party towards 
accumulation or enhancement of the same. 
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13. The pre-marital property ought to be returned to 
each as his or her sole and separate property. 
14. The trust Schedule A recites and describes the real 
estate which was placed in the Trust. Thus, the residence located 
in Salt Lake County, the Lewis Contract, Condominium in Maripose 
County, Arizona, and small protection strip of land was so placed. 
15. Schedule A continues on page 2 to describe the 
accounts place in the Trust. Of the total accounts listed, only 
two accounts were, in fact, placed into the Trust by executing the 
necessary documents to convert the accounts from the plaintifffs 
name of plaintiff's name and former wife's name to the Kirk Family 
Trust. 
16. These accounts were money market checking account, 
Valley Bank & Trust, Account #02-30-406-65 and Franklin U.S. 
Government Securities Fund Investment account No. 10178837808. 
17. The remaining accounts listed in Schedule A, page 2, 
were not placed into the Trust due to the plaintiff's preoccupation 
with remodeling tasks. 
18. The transfer of the real property by either party 
and the transfer of the accounts by either party into the trust 
does not change the character of the pre-marital or inherited 
property to that of joint property. 
19. The accumulation of the plaintiff's property were 
through the pre-marital efforts of himself and his deceased wife 
prior to the instant marriage, as was the defendant's pre-marital 
property. 
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20. The establishment of the Kirk Family Trust is not 
and cannot be construed as a pre-nuptial agreement which would 
purportedly govern the rights of the parties should a divorce 
occur. 
21. The Kirk Family Trust was an estate planning device 
and was so contemplated by the parties. 
22. That the assets transferred in part by the plaintiff 
and the majority of the assets of the defendant was never 
contemplated as a gift between the parties of his or her pre-
marital assets to the other. 
23. The Trust did not contemplate divorce but rather 
provided for the respective parties should one predecease the 
other. 
24. The placement of defendant's name on the plaintiff's 
Valley Bank account No. 913213945 as a joint signatory does not 
amount to co-mingling of those funds. The same holds true on the 
placing of the plaintiff's name on the defendant's checking account 
at First Interstate No. 28-16407-7. 
25. The adding of each other's names to his or her 
separate bank account was in form, not substance, i.e.: each party 
continued to treat his or her account as his or her separate 
incomes and withdrawals for their separate expenses. 
26. This treatment is consistent with the fact that each 
continued to treat his or her pre-marital bank accounts as they had 
Drior to the marriage. 
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27. The fact that plaintiff made payments for the 
majority of the party's joint living expenses form the Valley Bank 
does not alter the practice and interest of the parties to keep and 
maintain his or her bank account separate and apart. 
28. The defendant contributed nothing to the day to day 
living expenses from her First Interstate Account. 
29. There was no co-mingling of the parties separate 
incomes• 
30. The placement of the other party1s names by either 
party does not establish that a gift was intended by the transferor 
to the transferee. 
31. There was no intent of either party to divest 
himself or herself of all dominion and control to the other. 
32. Transfer to the Kirk Family Trust was not a transfer 
to the other party as an individual. 
33. Both parties were recipients as a designated 
trustees governed by the terms of the Trust Agreement. It was an 
interest which would become vested upon the death of either party. 
34. The Trust Agreement, by its terms, is revocable by 
either party, although neither had done so at the time of the 
divorce. 
35. The defendant was under a temporary restraining 
order not to transfer any of the marital assets. 
36. All property that have been transferred into the 
Kirk Family Trust should be returned to the original owners to be 
held as his or her sole and separate property. 
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37. While the Court has determined that the plaintiff's 
promises to the defendant are not sufficient to allow her to assert 
a legal claim against the plaintifffs premarital properties, the 
Court is satisfied that the plaintifffs promises which induced the 
defendant to give up financial security are enforceable. The 
plaintiff made promises of financial security to the defendant to 
induce her to enter into the marriage relationship. The Court is 
satisfied that she would not have entered into the marital 
relationship except for the promises of the plaintiff that she 
would be reasonably financially secure should she agree to give up 
her sources of income in the form of permanent alimony from a prior 
spouse and enter into the marital relationship with the plaintiff. 
The plaintiff made a promise which he acknowledges. The promise is 
significant as far as the defendant was concerned, and the 
plaintiff ought to be held to his promise in all good conscience 
and in equity. In addition, defendant is in need of alimony. Her 
resources are not sufficient to meet that need and plaintiff is 
financially capable of providing alimony to defendant as 
hereinafter set forth. Furthermore, it does not appear that 
defendant due to her current circumstances and age will be able to 
rehabilitate herself so that in the foreseeable future she will be 
capable of meeting her own financial needs. This Court, therefore, 
letermines that defendant is entitled to permanent alimony from 
)laintiff even though the marriage was of short duration. 
In considering the amount of permanent alimony that 
hould be paid to the plaintiff, the Court has taken into account 
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the limited ability of the defendant to earn income, her age and 
her needs as well as the style in which the parties lived during 
the course of the marriage, even though it was short. The 
defendant gave up a comfortable apartment, many of her personal 
pieces of property at the insistence of the plaintiff, and of 
course gave up her permanent alimony income from her former 
husband. 
38. Defendants current income consists of her income 
from her employment, which net after expenses is $256 a month based 
upon the 1992 income tax return. She receives $496 in social 
security. She has a condominium in Arizona which she rents for 
$700 but after payment of the underlying mortgage and condominium 
assessment, there actually is no net income from this property and, 
in fact, the net expense is $62 a month. Defendant's total monthly 
income without benefit of alimony from plaintiff is only the sum of 
$690 a month. This income was set out in defendant's Exhibit 24, 
which the Court accepts. 
39. The Court finds that defendant's reasonable monthly 
living expenses are $2,287 as reflected in her Exhibit D-25, which 
the Court accepts and finds to be reasonable based upon the 
standard of living of the parties during their marriage and the 
standard of living of the defendant prior to her marriage to 
plaintiff. 
40. The Court finds that plaintiff has substantial 
ability to assist the defendant in meeting her monthly expenses and 
to provide for her financial well being in accordance with his 
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premarital promises• Over the years the plaintiff has acquired 
substantial financial assets in the form of investments and 
retirements. He owns or is a mortgage holder on real property. 
The balance sheet prepared by him as of July 15, 1992, and 
introduced as Exhibit D-18, reflects assets having a net equity of 
over $500,000. His own personal expenses are minimal by his own 
choice and as reflected under Exhibit P-3 setting forth his list of 
monthly expenses only come to $2,319 a month. Plaintiff's income 
as reflected in the 1992 income tax return of the parties 
introduced as Exhibit D-29 and an analyzed by E. J. Passey, CPA, 
as set forth in Exhibit D-33, shows that he receives social 
security payments each year of $10,200, retirement plan payments 
each year of $14,000 and interest and dividend income each year 
based upon the 1992 tax return of $25,184. The combined amounts of 
these sources of income are $49,384 or $3,497.67 per month. 
By his own choice, plaintiff does not draw against 
his retirement or other assets even though he has the ability to do 
so. It is clear to the Court that the plaintiff has the financial 
ability to assist the defendant in the form of permanent alimony. 
41. Based upon the needs of the defendant and the 
financial abilities of
 Athe plaintiff, also based upon what the 
defendant gave up when entering into the marriage and considering 
the promises made to the defendant by the plaintiff and reasonable 
needs of the defendant, the Court is satisfied that an ongoing 
alimony requirement in the sum of $1,000 per month is necessary and 
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reasonable, which alimony should continue until such time as 
defendant should remarry, cohabit or the death of either party, 
42. The defendant, through Exhibit 27 and other 
testimony suggests that as a result of the plaintiff's demand, she 
disposed of certain property that she owned and enjoyed prior to 
the marriage. 
43. With the exception of the moving expenses, the 
following are found to as indicated: 
(1) Washer/dryer was purchased in 1970 and sold to 
son. 
(2) Antique piano given to the defendant in 1980 
and given to defendant's daughter in Hawaii. 
(3) Dining room set consisting of a buffet, 12 
years old; table, 40 years old; chairs, 15 years old. 
(4) Art work (Sante Fe Gallery) given to 
defendant's daughter, Pam. 
(5) Sewing machine, purchased 12 years ago, given 
to defendant's daughter, Leslie. 
(6) Sheepskin rug was ruined. It was purchased 11-
12 years ago. 
44. In all ojf the foregoing items, the Court could not 
find that a market value as opposed to replacement as purported by 
the defendant, was established. Nor was the replacement value 
reflecting of their current value. 
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45. Nor was the Court unable to determine any legal or 
equitable basis upon which to order the plaintiff to pay for the 
value of those properties. 
46. The moving costs requested by defendant are rejected 
in that there is no legal or equitable basis for such 
reimbursement. 
47. Other items of personal property on Exhibit No. 26 
are as follows: 
(1) All defendant's financial records left at 
plaintiff's residence—including but not 
limited to the following: 1990 tax return 
and all supporting documents; 1991 tax records 
of defendant; 1991 First Interstate Bank 
statements/checks/deposits; and 1992 First 
Interstate Bank statements/checks/deposits 
prior to the parties1 separation 
(2) Wig base for defendant's wig block. 
(3) Two large turntables and round wooden cutting 
board with handle. 
(4) Navy blue ski sweater (expensive woolen) 
(5) Navy tennis sweater (button front) 
(6) New ice bucket 
(7) Bathroom scales 
(8) Meat rack (never used) 
(9) All defendant's tools 
(10) Wok and round wok base 
(11) Fondue dish and serving dishes in bright 
colored metal 
(12) Defendant's sister's two larger family 
portraits in gold ornate frames 2' x 4' in size 
(13) Stainless steel coffee server and tray 
(14) Brown wicker bedroom lamp 
(15) Double hibachi (electric) 
(16) 18 \ tall yellow blown glass vase given to 
defendant by her sister before sister's death 
(17) Cutting board, tray and utensils to Weber 
cooking 
(18) Yellow metal mug rack and yellow taper candle 
holder with mugs with "Love" on each cup given 
to defendant by her daughter for Mother's Day 
(19) Roll of quilted covering for tabletop to play 
cards on (new, still in original plastic bag, 
never used) 
(20) 2f oak and copper pot rack 
(21) Yellow water repellant hooded jacket 
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48. To the extent that items 1 to 21 on Exhibit 26 are 
in plaintifffs possession, they should be returned. 
49. The defendant expended certain sums prior to the 
marriage of the parties for the benefit of the defendant. 
50. Plaintiff has requested that he be reimbursed from 
defendant for certain sums which he paid on behalf of the defendant 
prior to the marriage. These were identified in his testimony as 
medical treatment for defendant, paying off defendant's obligation 
to Chase Visa, a medical bill at Cottonwood Center and the purchase 
of a wedding ring for the defendant. The Court finds that these 
expenditures were gifts from the plaintiff to the defendant and to 
the extent that plaintiff seeks reimbursement or credit in some 
other fashion for those amounts, that claim is rejected by the 
Court. 
51. Defendant seeks an award of attorney's fees from 
plaintiff on the basis that she is in need of assistance 
financially to meet those attorney's fee obligations and that the 
plaintiff has the ability to assist her in connection therewith. 
The Court is satisfied that the plaintiff ought to be required to 
assist the defendant in meeting her attorney's fee obligation not 
only for the reasons suggested by the defendant, that is her need 
and the plaintiff's ability to pay, but based upon the unreasonable 
approach that the plaintiff has taken to the resolution of this 
case. 
Plaintiff's suggestion that the parties should be 
required to merely take what they brought into the marriage and 
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walk away with no further financial obligation, between them is 
disingenuous. This is particularly true in view of the aggressive 
nature of the courting of the defendant by plaintiff and his 
promises to her to induce her to enter into the marital 
relationship. While fault for the deterioration of the marriage is 
not an issue in this case, the Court is satisfied that for whatever 
reasons only known to the plaintiff, he apparently had second 
thoughts after the marriage regarding the propriety of his original 
conduct, and that for the most part caused the dissolution of the 
relationship between the parties. 
Defendant is effectively without any substantial 
assets except the condominium in Arizona which provides her with no 
positive cash flow. She is without funds with which to pay for the 
costs of her attorney in this action. Plaintiff has assets in 
excess of $500,000 and the Court finds that defendant is in need 
for payment of her attorney's fees and plaintiff has the financial 
ability to meet those fees. 
52. The Court finds that the attorney's fees testified 
bo by Mr. Dart in this case are reasonable in amount and were 
necessarily incurred in this case and that the plaintiff should be 
required to pay to the^defendant for the use and benefit of her 
attorney the sums proffered by Mr. Dart at the conclusion of the 
evidence in this case. The Court determines those attorney's fees 
:o be $6,565, the amount still due Mr. Dart after partial payment 
jy the defendant herein. The Court further determines that the 
iefendant is entitled to reimbursement of her legitimate costs 
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incurred in this matter and as reflected in the exhibit attached to 
defendant's Exhibit D-34, in the total amount of $592.47. 
53. The Court anticipates each party may have some 
dissatisfaction with this ruling and for that reason counsel for 
each of the parties is to be involved in the drafting of these 
Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, which have put into effect 
the decision this Court has contained in its Memorandum Decision. 
The Court would request that Mr. Dart take the responsibility for 
the initial draft to be supplemented by Mr. Mitsunaga, particularly 
on the issue where Mr. Mitsunaga7s client has prevailed, to wit: 
the issue of premarital property and the issue of reimbursement for 
personal property which the defendant brought into the marriage and 
which was given away or sold during the marriage. 
From the foregoing Findings of Fact, the Court now makes 
the following: 
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
1. Each of the parties is entitled to a Decree of 
Divorce from the other on the grounds of irreconcilable 
differences, which Decree shall become final upon signing and 
entry. 
2. Each of the parties is awarded any items of property 
which he or she had at the time of the marriage of the parties free 
of any claim of the other. 
3. Defendant is awarded alimony from plaintiff in the 
sum of $1,000 a month until such time as defendant should remarry, 
cohabit or the death of either party. 
20 
4. Defendant is awarded attorney's fees in the sum of 
$6,565 and costs in the amount of $592.47. 
5. Each party is ordered to execute any documents and 
perform any acts necessary to effectuate the terms of the Decree of 
Divorce when entered. 
DATED this j % day Q£ fUJIAAtfW^ , 1993. Qrti&Aj. 
TIMOTHY R. HANSON 
C o u r t J u d g e 
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT1 
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
000OOO000 
OTIS B. KIRK, JR., 
Plaintiff, 
v. 
PEGGIE M. KIRK, 
Defendant. 
DECREE OF DIVORCE 
Civil No. 924901796DA 
Judge Timothy R. Hanson 
000OOO000 
The above matter came on for trial on March 9 and March 
23, 1993, before the Honorable Timothy R. Hanson, Judge. 
Prior to trial, the Court consolidated a companion case 
wherein the plaintiff had filed a divorce as No. 924901796, and 
treating the second filed lawsuit as a counterclaim in the original 
surviving action. 
The parties and witnesses having been duly sworn and 
exhibits offered and received and the Court having heard oral 
arguments of counsel and, having taken the matter under advisement 
and having rendered a written memorandum decision on May 4, 1993 
and the Court having entered its Findings of Fact and Conclusions 
of Law, 
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECREED: 
1. The parties are granted a Decree of Divorce, each 
from the other, said Decree to become final upon entry. 
2. The plaintiff is awarded all of his premarital 
property as his sole and separate property as follows: 
Residence: 3518 2000 East, Salt Lake City, Utah. 
This is a resident structure with 1.25 acres. 
It was purchased by the plaintiff and his deceased 
wife in 1956 and fully paid off in 1980. The 
property is now encumbered by a construction loan 
for approximately $59,000.00. 
Strip of land: This is a one foot wide protection 
strip granted by Salt Lake County and is adjacent 
and contiguous to the lot upon which the residence 
(paragraph 22(a) is situated and was purchased at 
the same time. 
Lewis contract: This is a real estate contract on 
the sale of real property acquired by the plaintiff 
and his deceased wife in 1966. The real estate 
contract was entered into December 5, 1980. 
Pensions and retirement (Monthly): 
(Legend: I, inherited from deceased wife, PMS, 
premarital source) 
Carpenter Union P/M/S $ 64.00 
Boise Cascade P/M/S 676.00 
U.S. West I 423.00 
Dividends - Interest (Monthly): 
Mountain American CU I 2.16 
Putnam IRA P/M/S 158.65 
Boise Cascade Supplemental Savings 631.40 
U.S. Government Security (Jt) 465.00 
00128 
5. Alliance Government Reserve (Jt) 2.30 
6. No. american Service Trusts 162.50 
7. Thomson Growth Fund (Jt) 0 
8. AT&T I 4.04 
9. Ameritech I 8.20 
10. Bell Atlantic I 11.34 
11. Bell South I 7.42 
12. NYNEX 11.37 
13. Pactel I 7.42 
14. South West Bell 7.66 
15. U.S. West I 41.38 
F. Social Security: 
1. Social Security P/M/S 869.00 
G. Valley bank checking P/M/S 
This is the only checking account used by the 
plaintiff before and after the marriage. Two 
transfers were made by the plaintiff into 
this checking account: 
1. December 7, 1990 - monies from deceased wife's 
retirement $20,176.00 
2. Feb. 1991 - monies from deceased wife's 
retirement $14,269.66 
H. Retirements, pensions & Stock (Exhibit 9): 
1. Mountain Credit Union I 650.00 
2. Putnam IRA P/M/S 23,432.98 
3. Putnam IRA Cash account 
5. 
6. 
4. Boise Cascade Supplemental 
Retirement JT 
Franklin U.S. Government 
Security Fund P/M/S 
U.S. government Securities -
North Am Service Trust P/M/S 
7. Alliance Government Reserve P/M/S 
8. Mainstay Family of Funds P/M/S 
9. Thomson Fund 
10. AT&T Stock I 
11. Ameritech I 
12. Bell Atlantic I 
13. Bell South I 
14. NYNEX 
15. Pactel I 
16. Southwest Bell I 
17. U.S. West I 
18. U.S. West I 















Vehicles: (Inherited and pre-marital) 
1. 1980 Chevrolet 
2. 1981 Toyota 
3. 1968 Nomad Trailer 
4. 1975 Yamaha motorcycle 
The defendant is awarded all of her premarital 
property as her sole and separate property as follows: 
cci:o 
1. Condominium 7018 No. Barbados 
in Phoenix, Arizona 
Market Value $80,000.00 
2. Household furniture and fixtures 
3. 1983 Lincoln Continental Mark VI 
4. First Interstate, checking account 
#21-28727-1 66.53 
5. First Interstate checking 
#28-16407-7 Balance 9,537.00 
"Peggie M. Kirk" 
"Otis B. Kirk" 
4. Defendant is awarded alimony from plaintiff in the 
sum of $1,000 a month until such time as defendant should remarry, 
cohabit or the death of either party. 
5. Defendant is awarded attorney's fees in the sum of 
$6,565 and costs in the amount of $592.47. 
6. Each party is ordered as individual or trustees 
under the Kirk Family Trust to execute tne necessary documents to 
transfer ownership of the premarital assets to the respective 
parties. 
DATED this /X day /f ) , 1993. 
•M^-
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PEGGIE M JENNINGS TAYLOR 
P 0 BOX 21126 
SALT LAKE CITY, UT 84121 
CHECKBOOK INTEREST 
HILLSIDE PLAZA OFFICE 
ACCOUNT 28 16407 7 
COMBINED STATEMENT 
OF ACCOUNT 
JUNE 19, 1991 
PAGE 2 
17 28 08 
BEGINNING BALANCE 5,388.37 
4 DEPOSITS (+ ) 
17 CHECKS ( - ) 
0 OTHER ( - ) 
INTEREST PAID ( + ) 
SERVICE CHARGE ( - ) 
ENDING BALANCE 
DEPOSITS 
JUNE 1 9 , 1991 














0 6 / 1 9 
CHECKS 
DATE 
0 5 / 2 0 
0 6 / 1 9 
06 /03 
0 5 / 3 1 
0 6 / 0 7 
06 /06 






















DEPOSITS (+ ) 
CHECKS ( -0 
OTHER ( - ) 
















































. 0 0 
. 0 0 
. 0 0 
. 0 0 
. 0 0 
ENDING BALANCE JUNE 19, 1991 .00 
TRANSACTION DETAIL AND CANCELLED CHECKS FOR THIS ACCOUNT HILL BE MAILED 
SEPARATELY ON THIS ACCOUNTS REGULAR STATEMENT DATE. 
INTEREST PAID YTD .15 
GET ACCOUNT INFORMATION DAY OR NIGHT HITH DAY £ NIGHT 






First Interstate Bank 
of Utah, N.A. 
EGGIE M KIRK 
TIS B KIRK 
HE KIRK FAMILY TRUST 
0 BOX 21126 
ALT LAKE CITY, UT 84121 
31 28 08 
REFERRED CHECKING 
ILLSIDE PLAZA OFFICE 
CCOUNT 28 16407 7 







DEPOSITS (+ ) 
CHECKS ( - ) 
OTHER C-) 
INTEREST PAID C+) 




0 2 / 0 3 
0 2 / 0 8 
0 2 / 1 9 
CHECKS 
DATE 
0 2 / 1 1 
0 1 / 2 2 
0 1 / 2 1 
0 1 / 2 5 
0 1 / 2 6 
0 1 / 2 7 
0 2 / 0 1 
0 2 / 0 5 
0 2 / 0 5 
0 2 / 0 2 
0 2 / 0 3 
0 2 / 0 2 
0 2 / 0 3 
0 2 / 0 3 
0 2 / 1 0 
























3 2 . 0 9 
4 9 . 9 5 



















0 2 / 1 1 












































1 2 . 7 4 
13 .76 




3 2 . 0 0 
9 . 7 1 
22 .72 
1 9 . 5 1 
105 .00 
8 . 2 0 
24 .96 
Member Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation • Member Federal Reserve System 






First Interstate Bank 
of Utah. N.A. 
PEGGIE M KIRK 
P 0 BOX 21126 
SALT LAKE CITY, UT 84121 
0 21 09 
CHECKING 
MURRAY OFFICE 
ACCOUNT 21 28727 1 
FEBRUARY 22, 1993 
PAGE 1 
BEGINNING BALANCE 
1 DEPOSIT (+ ) 
0 CHECKS ( - ) 
0 OTHER ( - ) 
SERVICE CHARGE C-) 
ENDING BALANCE 
DEPOSITS 
FEBRUARY 2 2 , 1993 












Member Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation • Member Federal Reserve System 
.14a (8*U NOTICE: SEE REVERSE SIDE FOR IMPORTANT iMPnomLTiruj 
EXHIBIT "G" 
STATEMENT OF MONTHLY EXPENSES 
PEGGIE TAYLOR-KIRK 
fa^bllo0} 
Rent, Salt Lake City $550 
Electricity 45 
Mountain Fuel 35 
Water, sewer, garbage 25 
Telephone 52 
Food and household supplies 225 
Lunches out 50 
Clothing (included in VISA payment below) 
Dry cleaning/laundry 10 
Automobile insurance 50 
Automobile gas, oil, repairs, maintenance 250 
Medical and Rx 100 
Dental 30 
Health insurance (anticipated after divorce—FHP) 100 
Business expenses/licensing 85 
Business schools/seminars 40 
Entertainment 100 
Vacation/travel (Annual trip to Hawaii to visit 
daughter; occasional travel to Phoenix) 125 
Personal grooming 35 
Gifts/Christmas 55 
Miscellaneous and incidentals 125 
VISA payment 100 
TOTAL MONTHLY EXPENSES $2,287 
EXHIBIT "H" 




NO. & / 
Income (From 1992 Tax Return) 
Income from earnings (net after expenses) 
$3,068 annual 
Social Security 
Rental income: Arizona condo 



















TOTAL INCOME BEFORE TAXES $1,690 
Less Taxes (per E.J. Passey analysis): 




NET EXPENDABLE MONTHLY INCOME 
with alimony at $1,000 per month 
$1,602 
EXHIBIT T* 
PEGGIE KIRK ATTORNEY'S FEES AND COSTS RECAP 
\t DEFENDANT'S 
EXHIBIT 
NO. § y 
Services Rendered: 
Mr. Dart — 42.75 hours at $175/hour 
Mr. Sheaffer — 1.80 hours at $100/hour 
Ms. Clark — 19.25 hours at $ 75/hour 
Paralegal Services — 30.65 hours at $50/hour 
Total Services Rendered: 
Costs Advanced: 
Filing fee - Complaint 
Service fee for Complaint, TRO and OSC 
Filing fee - Answer and Counterclaim 
Deposition of Otis Kirk & copy of deposition 
of Peggie Kirk 





Total Costs Advanced: 
Total Services and Costs: 
Less Retainer Paid 4/22/92 
























( i , 
, 4 8 1 , 
1 8 0 . 
4 4 3 . 
5 3 2 . 
7637^ 
8 2 . 


















. 0 0 
. 4 5 
. 0 0 
. 2 0 
. 3 2 
. 5 0 




Tota-1 Balance Due: $ 6,565.05 
